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CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and Reality 
NITZAN SHILON* 
This Article is the first academic endeavor to analyze the efficacy and 
transparency of stock ownership policies (SOPs) in U.S. public firms. SOPs 
generally require managers to hold some of their firms’ stock for the long term. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, firms universally adopted these policies and 
cited them more than any other policy as a key element in their mitigation of risk. 
However, my analysis of the recent SOPs of S&P 500 CEOs disputes what firms 
claim about these policies. First, I find that SOPs are extremely ineffectual in 
making CEOs hold on to their firm’s stock; this is because these policies generally 
function in a way that allows CEOs to immediately unload virtually all of the stock 
they own. Second, I show that firms camouflage this weakness in their public 
filings. I explain why my findings are troubling and I propose a regulatory reform 
to make SOPs transparent. Transparency can be expected to push boards and 
shareholders to improve the actual content of these policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 2008–09 financial crisis, regulators, firms, investors, and practitioners 
around the world have been trying to ensure that executive pay arrangements in 
public firms discourage managers from taking excessive risks and pursuing 
short-term gains at the expense of long-term value.1 In particular, shareholders 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. The recent Basel II amendment requires banking regulators at the international level to 
monitor compensation structures with a view to decoupling compensation from short-term profits. 
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 25–
27 (2009). The G-20 leaders are committed to implementing international standards to discourage 
excessive risk taking. Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit 2 (Sept. 24–25, 2009), 
available at https://www.g20.org/official_resources/leaders%E2%80%99_statement_pittsburgh
_summit.The United Kingdom has already implemented requirements to establish remuneration 
policies that promote effective risk management. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., REFORMING 
REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: FEEDBACK ON CP09/10 AND FINAL RULES 
app. 1 at 3–13 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps09_15.pdf. Other 
countries have been moving in this direction as well. See, e.g., SWISS FIN. MKT. SUPERVISORY 
AUTH., REMUNERATION SCHEMES: MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR REMUNERATION SCHEMES OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–7 (2010), available at http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents
/finma-rs-2010-01-e.pdf (requiring simple, transparent, long-term remuneration schemes; 
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have pushed firms to adopt stock ownership policies (SOPs), which require senior 
executives and directors to hold a minimum dollar value of their firms’ stock until 
retirement and, in some cases, thereafter. In addition to shareholder pressure to 
adopt SOPs, the federal government has prescribed strict SOPs for some firms,2 
prominent public officials have emphasized the importance of SOPs,3 business 
leaders have stressed the need for them,4 and proxy-voting firms have rewarded 
firms for adopting them.5 As a result, the prevalence of SOPs reached an all-time 
high of 95% among the top 250 U.S. public firms in 2013.6 
Firms have adopted SOPs and held them to attain very important goals. One 
such goal is to align the interests of managers with those of their long-term 
shareholders. When SOPs tie managers’ personal wealth to their firms’ long-term 
value, managers have greater incentives to maximize such value. Empirical studies 
support this view and show that when management ownership rises in widely held 
firms, firm value increases significantly.7 Consistent with this theory, in a response 
to Facebook cofounder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s announcement on September 
                                                                                                                 
independent control over the implementation of those schemes; and the structuring of 
remuneration to enhance risk awareness). 
 2. Despite its general approach against regulating the substance of corporate 
governance provisions, the federal government has prescribed strict SOPs for all Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients. Specifically, the Treasury regulations preclude 
TARP recipient executives from cashing out any vested stock before TARP funds are repaid. 
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury 
Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg163.aspx (declaring that 
“compensation should be structured to account for the time horizon of risks”); Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of 
America's National Convention and Techworld: The Financial Crisis and Community 
Banking (Mar. 20, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20090320a.htm#fn3 (stating that “poorly designed compensation policies can 
create perverse incentives” and that “[m]anagement compensation policies should be aligned 
with the long-term prudential interests of the institution, be tied to the risks being borne by 
the organization, . . . and avoid short-term payments for transactions with long-term horizons”). 
 4. See, e.g., Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at 7 (declaring that “an individual’s performance should be evaluated 
over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking”). 
 5. See generally GARY HEWITT, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., GOVERNANCE 
RISK INDICATORS 2.0 (2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/GRId2.0
_TechnicalDocument20120306.pdf. 
 6. See MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, LLC, 2013 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & INCENTIVE 
DESIGN SURVEY 11 (2013) (reporting that only 5% of the 250 largest publicly traded firms did not 
disclose stock ownership guidelines for their CEOs), available at http://www.meridiancp.com
/images/uploads/Meridian_2013_Governance_and_Design_Survey.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293 (1988) (reporting that “Tobin’s 
Q first increases, then declines [when ownership becomes concentrated], and finally rises 
slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises”). Tobin’s Q, named after Nobel Prize 
winner James Tobin, is a measure that reflects the effectiveness with which a company turns 
a given book value into market value. It specifically measures the ratio of the combined 
market value of equity and debt to their combined book value. 
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4, 2012, that he would keep his Facebook stock for at least until the next year, 
Facebook’s stock price rose by 5%.8 
Second, because firms claim that their SOPs discourage excessive risk taking, 
they commonly cite those policies as a key element in their mitigation of risk.9 The 
theory is that without SOPs managers might have incentives to elevate the firm’s 
risk and increase stock price volatility. Such managers expect to profit from the 
higher volatility in stock price by pocketing greater amounts if they hold on to their 
stock while the price increases and to avoid losses by quickly selling their stock 
before the price plummets.10 
Third, firms hold their SOPs to discourage managers from sacrificing the long 
term for the short term. Without SOPs, managers might be tempted to take actions 
that would boost the stock price in the short term, even if those actions would pile 
up latent and excessive risk of an implosion later on. They might do so if they 
could unload their stock before such an implosion occurs. Even if they do not know 
if or when such an implosion will actually occur, they might still take such a 
strategy if they can gradually sell enough stock, thereby protecting themselves from 
a possible future collapse. A 2010 study suggests that such incentives played a role 
in the risk-taking decisions of the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers during the years preceding their firms’ meltdowns in 2008.11 SOPs are 
expected to discourage managers from taking such actions by limiting managers’ 
ability to sell their stock. 
In addition to what firms claim about their SOPs, these policies should fulfill an 
important function by tying pay to performance. Without effective SOPs, CEOs who 
have performed poorly may nevertheless earn a salary that is not commensurate with 
their performance. They might even generate profits by taking excessive risks.12 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See Sam Gustin, Facebook Blame-Game: Who’s at Fault for IPO Debacle?, TIME 
(Sep. 6, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/09/06/facebook-blame-game-whos-at-fault
-for-ipo-debacle/. While the company’s stock price rose 5% on the day after Zuckerberg’s 
announcement, such price was still nearly 50% below the initial public offering (IPO) price. 
 9. See Press Release, Equilar, Inc., Long-Term Performance Compensation Is Most Popular 
Risk-Management Strategy (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.prlog.org/10637727-long
-term-performance-compensation-is-most-popular-risk-management-strategy.html. 
 10. See generally Tao Chen, Vidhi Chhaochharia & Rik Sen, Holding On for Good 
Times: The Information Content of CEOs’ Voluntary Equity Exposure (Aug. 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~vchhaochharia/dokuwiki
/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=ceo_equity_exposure_19aug2012.pdf (reporting that CEOs have 
private information about future stock price performance and that they generally use that 
information to choose their stock exposure levels to the firm). 
 11. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: 
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 
260 (2010) (stating that the top-five-executive teams of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers 
cashed out large amounts of stock selling and cash bonus during 2000–08, the years that led 
to the credit crisis). However, commentators disagree on whether poor incentives contributed 
to the recent crisis. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 12. A CEO without an effective SOP may generate personal profits by increasing his 
stock holdings before taking an excessively risky project and unloading such stock before 
the project fails. For example, General Motors’ decision not to fix the faulty ignition 
switches in its Chevrolet Cobalts more than ten years ago was mentioned as a consequence 
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Finally, these policies are important because they set rules that apply widely to 
stock-based compensation, which is by far the most significant component of 
executive pay today. The boom in incentive pay that started in the 1990s pushed 
stock-based compensation so high that today the median compensation packages of 
CEOs of firms included in the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500)13 
includes 80% of stock.14 Moreover, the explosion of stock-based compensation was 
not accompanied by a reduction in non-stock-based compensation. Therefore, the 
total compensation amounts of the top five executives in public firms trended up to 
some 10% of these firms’ total earnings.15 
However, while in theory SOPs are important, in practice they are paper tigers. 
Using statistical analyses of quantitative and qualitative data disclosed in proxy 
statements of firms included in the S&P 500,16 I show that these policies are 
extremely ineffectual in making CEOs hold on to their firms’ stock and, in fact, 
typically allow CEOs to unload virtually all of their vested stock whenever they 
wish.17 For example, the SOP of UPS would not prevent its CEO, Scott Davis, 
                                                                                                                 
of GM executive compensation incentives. It apparently saved GM costs and increased its 
stock price in the short term, but came at the expense of a severe long-term problem after this 
decision was linked to thirteen deaths. Without an effective SOP, GM executives might have 
generated personal profits by selling their stock before the catastrophic results were uncovered. 
See Gretchen Morgenson, The Wallet as Ethics Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, at BU1. 
 13. The S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index is a market value weighted index 
composed of 500 stocks of leading companies in leading industries within the U.S. economy. 
See S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/indices.htm. 
 14. See EQUILAR, INC., 2014 CEO PAY STRATEGIES REPORT 6, 14 (2014), available at 
http://info.equilar.com/rs/equilar/images/equilar-2014-ceo-pay-strategies-report.pdf?mkt_tok
=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRojuKTNZKXonjHpfsX67%2BgqXrHr08Yy0EZ5VunJEUWy3YoITt
Q%2FcOedCQkZHblFnV0PSq28UaoNoqIK (reporting that in 2013 the median S&P 500 
CEO was paid a total compensation of roughly $10.1 million, while his stock-based 
compensation amounted to about $8.1 million). 
 15. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 297 (2005) (reporting that the ratio of the aggregate top five 
compensation to the aggregate earnings of public firms increased from 5% in 1993–95 to 
9.8% in 2001–03). 
 16. The SEC requires that shareholders of a public company receive a proxy statement 
prior to any shareholder meeting. The proxy statement must include all important facts about 
the issues on which shareholders are asked to vote. Such information should include how 
management is paid and what potential conflict-of-interest issues may arise with auditors. 
See Proxy Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/proxy.htm. 
 17. Vesting periods define when ownership of stock options or restricted stock transfers 
to managers. See Brian D. Cadman, Tjomme O. Rusticus & Jayanthi Sunder, Stock Option 
Grant Vesting Terms: Economic and Financial Reporting Determinants, 18 REV. ACCT. 
STUD. 1159, 1159 (2013). Vesting periods in the United States are usually three to five years 
for executives but are shorter for board members. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 
The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 7 (2000). Typically, the 
executive earns the prorated amount of his equity grant each year. See Equity Vesting 
Schedules for S&P 1500 CEOs, EQUILAR, INC. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.equilar.com
/publications/articles/equity-vesting-schedules-for-s-p-1500-ceos. For example, when an 
executive is granted three hundred restricted stock units with a three-year vesting schedule, 
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from immediately selling all his vested UPS stock—worth over $30 million—
should he choose to do so.18 Moreover, a recent study shows that most top 
executives take full advantage of their freedom to unload their firms’ stock and 
engage in massive stock selling.19 
This Article is the first academic endeavor to discuss both the ineffectiveness 
and lack of transparency of SOPs. My research indicates that the ineffectiveness of 
recent SOPs is driven by their design. In particular, firms generally fail to employ 
robust frameworks that require managers to always retain some of the stock they 
receive as compensation. Instead, the vast majority of SOPs require managers to hit 
a certain stock ownership threshold in the future, but they are sabotaged in several 
ways by their own design. 
First, common SOPs allow managers to count their unvested stock (stock that 
they do not own yet)20 to satisfy their SOP requirements; for the CEOs who do this, 
it is usually their only effort at compliance with those policies. For example, Mr. 
Davis satisfies his $8.4 million UPS SOP requirement solely by counting $12.3 
million worth of stock he does not own yet.21 
Second, the average SOP sets its target stock-holding threshold lower than 50% 
of a single year’s total compensation.22 SOPs are commonly framed to require 
CEOs to hold five times their base salary.23 But as the average S&P 500 CEO earns 
a base salary of less than 10% of his annual total pay,24 his SOP threshold amounts 
to less than 50% of such pay. 
Third, these policies usually allow CEOs to take five years to attain the required 
stock thresholds.25 This delay is significant for S&P 500 CEOs, whose average 
tenure has recently shrunk to eight years.26 Such weakness is particularly important 
                                                                                                                 
that CEO will typically own one hundred units after one year, another one hundred units 
after two years, and the remaining one hundred units after three years. SOPs define the post-
vesting stock holding requirements. 
 18. As of February 1, 2013, Scott Davis beneficially owned 385,167 Class A UPS 
shares. Because the market price of each such share on the NYSE was then $79.97, the total 
value of Davis’s vested UPS stock was more than $30.8 million. This estimate does not take 
into account the $460 million worth of vested UPS stock owned by the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, Inc., of which Davis serves on the corporate Board of Trustees. See United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 29 (Mar. 15, 2013). 
 19. See Tomislav Ladika, Do Firms Replenish Executives’ Incentives After Equity 
Sales? 2 (Sept. 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023858 (reporting that 61% of top executives in S&P 1500 firms 
sell firm equity at least once during their tenure, with the median sale equal to 15% of the 
executive’s total holdings in the firm). 
 20. See infra Part V.B. 
 21. See infra Part V.B. 
 22. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part V.B. 
 24. The average S&P 500 CEO earns a base salary of less than 10% of his annual total 
pay because his base salary is some $1 million while his total compensation is some $10.1 
million. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14. 
 25. See infra Part V.D. 
 26. The average tenure of a departing S&P 500 CEO in the United States was eight 
years in 2010, down from ten years in 2000. See THE CONFERENCE BD., THE 2011 CEO 
SUCCESSION REPORT 13 (2011). 
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because most policies do not require CEOs to hit any stock ownership milestone 
before their phase-in periods lapse. 
Finally, SOPs commonly do not specify the sanctions for breaching them. This 
omission might suggest that these policies are merely advisory rather than 
mandatory, which further weakens SOPs. Absent mandatory sanctions on 
executives who, for example, sell their stock in violation of their SOPs, the board 
of directors is left to exercise its own discretion on how to deal with such 
violations. For a variety of financial, social, and psychological reasons, executives 
have power and influence over directors that make it costly and difficult for 
directors to act in ways that are unfavorable for executives.
27
 Therefore, directors in 
publicly traded companies cannot be relied on to impose sanctions on their 
executives after a violation occurs. 
In addition to the extreme ineffectiveness of SOPs—and certainly more 
troubling—is the lack of transparency as firms camouflage the weakness of their 
policies in their public filings. In particular, not a single firm discloses big-picture 
indicators of policy weakness, such as the amount of stock managers are allowed to 
immediately unload and the amount of stock they have already unloaded.28 
Firms also fail to disclose some critical terms of their SOPs, such as counting 
policies,29 phase-in periods,30 or sanctions. Moreover, when such terms are 
disclosed, their implications are not made clear. For example, firms fail to indicate 
how their counting of unvested or hedged stock undermines their SOPs.31 
My findings about SOP ineffectiveness and lack of transparency are troubling. 
Because of their extreme ineffectiveness, these policies are unlikely to affect 
managers’ incentives and behavior, and so they are incapable of achieving the 
important goals they were established to attain. Such ineffectiveness comes at the 
shareholders’ expense because the policies’ weakness makes it impossible to align 
managers’ interests with those of their shareholders. 
Also, because the ineffectiveness of these policies is camouflaged, investors are 
unable to know whether the SOPs are valuable and whether they fulfill their 
purpose. One needs credible and detailed information in order to exercise good 
judgment. Without such information about the functionality of SOPs, boards and 
shareholders are unable to assess these policies accurately and make informed 
decisions as to whether and how they should be improved. The philosophy of U.S. 
securities regulations is to facilitate informed and intelligent decision making by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–27 (2004) (describing sources of 
executives’ influence over directors in public companies). 
 28. See infra Part VI.A. 
 29. I call a “counting policy” the SOP terms that define the type of equity securities that 
may be counted toward meeting the policies’ target ownership threshold. 
 30. I call a “phase-in period” the length of time allowed to the executive or director to 
attain his target stock threshold. 
 31. A “hedge” is buying one security and selling another to reduce risk. See RICHARD 
BREALY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, G-8 
(11th ed. 2013). When, for example, CEOs short sell their company stock against their SOP 
stock, they nullify their SOPs. 
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investors,32 but with SOPs, investors simply do not have the information to make 
such decisions. 
Shareholders believe that these policies are at least sometimes desirable, and so 
they push firms to adopt them; proxy-voting firms back up shareholders and reward 
firms for having SOPs;33 and firms adopt SOPs, declaring that their purpose is to 
attain important goals, such as acting as a curb on incentives for excessive 
managerial risk taking.34 However, declaring that SOPs are adopted to attain 
important goals and then camouflaging their inability to achieve those goals creates 
confusion and sends mixed messages. 
Also, the fact that SOP ineffectiveness is camouflaged suggests that their 
weakness is undesirable. If the weakness of SOPs were a selling point in markets, 
its disclosure would increase stock price and firm value; however, since firms are 
unable to justify the weakness of their policies, they hide it. 
A possible explanation for why SOPs are both extremely ineffective and 
camouflaged is that managers have excessive power vis-à-vis shareholders. This 
combination of limp and camouflaged policies allows managers to reap the 
reputational benefits of being subject to effective SOPs, meanwhile avoiding the 
personal costs that are associated with having such policies. In particular, SOP 
camouflage misleads markets into believing that managers’ incentives are better 
aligned with those of long-term shareholders, that managers no longer have 
incentives to take excessive risks, and that boards are not feckless. At the same 
time, it allows managers to avoid incurring the personal diversification and 
liquidity costs associated with having effective SOPs. Finally, SOP camouflage 
serves managers by making it unlikely that outsiders will exert pressure on firms to 
make their SOPs more effective, which would, of course, force executives to incur 
the costs they seek to avoid. 
To remedy these flaws, I propose a regulatory reform to make SOPs transparent. 
In particular, I propose reforming the rules that govern public firms’ filings with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Regulation S-K.35 
I offer specific quantitative measures to gauge SOP bottom-line efficacy, as well as 
certain qualitative measures that focus on the functioning of SOP design. With this 
information, I expect boards and shareholders assisted by proxy advisors, executive 
compensation advisors, and practitioners, to identify and remedy the flaws inherent 
in their SOPs. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See Ray Garrett Jr., Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Union 
League Club, Public Affairs Committee 8 (Feb. 20, 1975), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/022075garrett.pdf (declaring that “[n]otwithstanding 
some recent questioning of this philosophy, we are persuaded that the original 
assumptions—that full disclosure permits investors to make informed and intelligent choices 
. . . are as valid today as they were forty years ago”). 
 33. See infra Part II. 
 34. See Equilar, Inc., supra note 9 (reporting that tying compensation to long-term 
performance is the most commonly cited risk-management strategy (72% in proxy filings of 
one hundred companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater)). 
 35. Regulation S-K is a prescribed regulation under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 that 
lays out reporting requirements for various SEC filings used by public companies. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229 (2013). 
2015] CEO STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES 361 
 
This Article is developed in nine Parts. First, I explain the importance of SOPs 
as managerial incentives to maximize long-term shareholder value and avoid 
excessive risk taking. Second, I describe the several waves of SOP adoptions and 
the widespread pressure that led to them. Third, I present my methodology for 
studying SOPs in S&P 500 firms. Fourth, I describe the two major frameworks that 
firms use to design their SOPs. Fifth, I provide evidence for the extreme 
ineffectiveness of recent SOPs, after which I analyze the camouflaging of such 
ineffectiveness. In the seventh Part, I explain why SOP ineffectiveness and its 
camouflaging are troubling, and after that I propose reforms to make these policies 
transparent and therefore improve SOPs. The ninth Part presents my conclusion. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES (SOPS) 
Firms hold their SOPs to attain important goals.36 The three main goals in this 
regard are (1) to align managerial interests with those of their shareholders,37 (2) to 
discourage managers from pursuing short-term gains at the expense of long-term 
value creation,38 and (3) to discourage inappropriate risk taking related to the 
company’s business.39 
The proxy statement of Limited Brands, Inc. summarizes the commonly 
declared SOP objectives: “In addition to aligning the interests of our executive 
officers with those of our stockholders, the share ownership guidelines promote a 
long-term focus and discourage inappropriate risk-taking.”40 
A. SOPs Help To Align Managers’ Interests with Those of Shareholders 
In most large American corporations, ownership is separate from control.41 This 
separation happens when managers do not own most of the shares of the 
corporations they run. When manager-agents own little stock in a firm and 
shareholder-principals are too dispersed to force managers to maximize firm value, 
agency costs are created and corporate assets may be abused to benefit managers at 
the expense of shareholders.42 Such agency costs may be triggered by managers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Firms declare these goals in their new mandatory reporting of risk management 
strategies and in the “Compensation Management Discussion and Analysis” chapter of their 
proxy statements. 
 37. See, e.g., First Horizon Nat’l Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 53 (Mar. 16, 
2010); Marsh & McLennan Cos., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 41 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
 38. See, e.g., CA, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 39 (June 8, 2010); Family 
Dollar Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
 39. See, e.g., Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 23 (Mar. 23, 
2010); Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
 40. Ltd. Brands, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 21 (Apr. 7, 2010). 
 41. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (1932). 
 42. “Agency relationship” is a contract under which the principal(s) engage another 
person(s) (the agent(s)) to perform a service on behalf of the principal(s), which involves the 
delegation of a decision-making authority to the agent(s). See Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
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diverting corporate resources to themselves, taking perquisites, and exerting too 
little effort (“shirking”). The costs may also be triggered by managerial pursuit of 
non-value-maximizing objectives, such as making excessive acquisitions (“empire 
building”), encouraging excessive sales growth, and putting employee interests ahead 
of shareholders’ interests. When managers’ time horizons differ from those of 
long-term shareholders,43 they may take excessive risks and pursue short-term gains. 
Managerial agency costs can be significantly reduced if divergences from 
shareholder interests are limited by establishing appropriate incentives for 
managers. In particular, SOPs align managers’ interests with those of shareholders 
by requiring managers to hold a certain amount of their firms’ stock. The theory is 
that as their stakes rise, managers pay a larger share of the costs associated with 
their non-value-maximizing acts. Thus, they are less likely to squander corporate 
wealth and more likely to work harder to increase firm value.44 In support of this 
theory, a series of empirical studies shows that executives who hold more stock are 
significantly better stewards for shareholders, both in maximizing their value and in 
generating higher operating income.45 
The desire to align managerial interests with shareholder interests by increasing 
managerial stock holdings resulted in a dramatic change in executive compensation 
in the 1990s. During that decade, stock-based compensation spread at explosive 
rates in the United States, and compensation committees routinely justified this 
surge as having the effect of increasing managerial stock ownership. Between 1992 
and 2000, the average inflation-adjusted compensation of S&P 500 CEOs more 
than quadrupled, climbing from $3.5 million to $14.7 million and fueled primarily 
by an increase in the use of stock options.46 The ratio of the top five executives’ 
aggregate pay to public firms’ aggregate earnings increased from 5% in 1993–95 to 
some 10% in 2001–03.47 Institutional investors and shareholder activists have 
tolerated and even encouraged the surge in executive pay, believing that managerial 
ownership may reduce agency problems.48 
Stock-based compensation also increased during the 2000s and has since 
become the biggest component of executive compensation at large, publicly traded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. This may happen because of managers’ career concerns or their ability to trade on 
inside information. 
 44. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 308 (explaining that “[t]he principal can 
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent . . . to 
limit the aberrant activities of the agent” (emphasis omitted)). 
 45. See, e.g., Morck et al., supra note 7; Robert Tumarkin, How Much Do CEO Incentives 
Matter? (July 11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu
/rtumarki/research/HMDCIM.pdf (reporting that “[f]or the mean incentive level, Tobin’s q 
increases by 10.0% compared to that of counterfactual firms that lack CEO incentive 
compensation”). A similar empirical conclusion has been reported by Bhagat and Tookes with 
regard to the positive effect that actual directorial equity holding has over future operating 
performance. See Sanjai Bhagat & Heather Tookes, Voluntary and Mandatory Skin in the 
Game: Understanding Outside Directors’ Stock Holdings, 18 EUR. J. FIN. 191 (2011). 
 46. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 49, 51 (2003). 
 47. See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 15. 
 48. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the 
Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1367 (2000). 
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U.S. firms. For the average S&P 500 CEO in 2013, stock-based compensation—
namely stock options and restricted stock—was worth some $8.1 million, which 
amounted to more than 80% of the CEO’s $10.1 million total compensation.49 
By requiring managers to keep some of their stock-based compensation, SOPs aim 
to maintain the manager-shareholder alignment incentives that equity pay provides. 
Warren Buffett showed by self-example that he supports this view: in 2008, Buffett 
conditioned his sizable Goldman Sachs and GE investments by making those 
companies’ executives commit to not selling more than 10% of their stock until the 
earlier of three years or the termination of Buffett’s investment.50 Many people 
believe that the importance that Buffett places on SOPs should serve as a wake-up 
call to both firms and investors in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.51 
Similarly, Facebook shareholders have made it clear that they value managerial 
ownership and see it as a sign of commitment to their company. Despite their 
growing concern about the company’s tanking stock price and torrent of criticism, 
Facebook shareholders sent the company’s stock price 5% higher in response to the 
September 4, 2012, announcement of Mark Zuckerberg, cofounder and CEO, that 
he would keep his Facebook stock for at least the next year.52 
B. SOPs Discourage Managers from Pursuing Short-Term Gains 
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke stressed the importance of 
discouraging managers from seeking short-term gains,53 a goal that SOPs 
should fulfill by requiring managers to hold their firms’ stock for the long term. 
Managers who are allowed to sell enough stock quickly might take actions that 
would boost the stock price in the short term even if they would certainly 
destroy value in the long term. Such actions include making distorted 
investment decisions,54 engaging in direct earnings management55 or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14. 
 50. See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 16 (Apr. 6, 2009). 
 51. See “Hold Through Retirement”: Maximizing the Benefits of Equity Awards While 
Minimizing Inappropriate Risk Taking, CORP. EXEC. (Exec. Press, Inc., Concord, CA), Nov.–
Dec. 2008, at 1. 
 52. See Gustin, supra note 8. 
 53. See Bernanke, supra note 3 (stressing the need to avoid using short-term metrics for 
transactions with long-term horizons when paying managers). 
 54. See Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2195 (2009) (reporting evidence that firms engaged in fraudulent 
accounting to boost short-term price also hire and invest too much, distorting the allocation 
of real sources); Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate 
Investment: A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 212 (2009) (finding that 
managers with short-term horizons engage in high abnormal investments and suffer 
subsequently from low stock returns, and that this phenomenon is more severe in firms with 
higher research and development intensity or share turnover). 
 55. “Direct earnings management” is the strategic timing of investment, sales, 
expenditures, and financing decisions to influence short-term accounting results and the 
short-term stock price at the expense of long-term economic value. See François Degeorge, 
Jayendu Patel & Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Management To Exceed Thresholds, 72 J. 
BUS., 1, 2–3 (1999). To manage reported earnings, for example, short-term managers 
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misreporting,56 and making certain public statements or performing other acts 
of “window dressing.”57 
At any given time, the short-term incentives of the manager will depend on the 
fraction of stock-based instruments that can be freely unloaded in the near future as 
opposed to the fraction that is tied up for the long term. When the manager is allowed 
to sell enough stock quickly, he might take actions that boost the stock price in the 
short run even if they might hurt the firm’s long-term reputation and performance. 
C. SOPs Help To Curb Managers’ Incentives To Take Excessive Risks 
SOPs should address two types of managerial incentives to take excessive risks. 
The first type involves opportunities to profit from stock price volatility.58 Managers 
who are looking to capitalize on their inside information will pursue actions that may 
increase the riskiness of the firm’s operations and thereby increase stock volatility; 
this is because greater stock volatility makes it more profitable for managers to 
unload their stock before its value tanks or keep it if the price stands to increase.59 
For example, consider a transaction that will boost a firm’s stock price from $40 
to $60 if it succeeds but would tank the price from $40 to $20 if it fails. There is a 
50% probability of either success or failure. Such a transaction significantly 
                                                                                                                 
increase the frequency of short-term, retail-level marketing actions (price discounts, feature 
advertisements, and aisle displays) at the expense of long-term brand equity investment 
(such as television advertisement) to influence the timing of consumers’ purchases. See 
Craig J. Chapman & Thomas J. Steenburgh, An Investigation of Earnings Management 
Through Marketing Actions (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-073, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=930738. Real earning 
management neither violates securities law nor is prohibited by corporate law. See, e.g., 
Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (ruling that directors are 
allowed to deliberately cause their firms to pay extra taxes so that the firms can report higher 
short-term earnings), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). 
 56. “Misreporting” is the practice of “earnings manipulation involving merely the 
discretionary accounting of decisions and outcomes already realized.” See Degeorge et al., 
supra note 55, at 3. Earnings manipulation can either be legal, so that it does not violate the 
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or illegal. From 1998 to 2004, for example, 
Fannie Mae illegally manipulated its quarterly earnings so that its executives could pocket 
higher bonuses. Reworking its accounting has cost Fannie Mae some $1 billion. See Marcy 
Gordon, Wall St. Applauds Fannie Mae Restatement, FOX NEWS (Dec. 7, 2006), 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2006Dec07/0,4675,FannieMae,00.html. 
 57. When a CEO’s ownership of stock options increases, the company is more likely to 
be involved in financial misreporting; however, the CEO’s ownership of other compensation 
components, such as restricted stock or long-term incentive payouts, is not associated with a 
higher propensity to misreport. See Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of 
Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63 (2006). 
 58. For managers to have superior information, such risk should be latent or the timing 
in which it materializes should be known only to them. 
 59. Such protection from stock depreciation renders managers’ stock akin to stock 
options. This is because stock option holders may fully gain from stock price appreciation 
but are entirely protected against any decrease in stock price. Stock option value increases 
with volatility of stock for this reason: greater volatility offers its holder more potential for 
an upside without risking losses from greater potential for downside movement. Managers 
who may unload their stock freely enjoy similar incentives. 
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elevates the firm’s risk but does not create any value for shareholders. Thus, 
managers who are unhampered by effective SOPs might be motivated to pursue 
this project and take advantage of their inside information to sell their stock before 
market price changes if the project appears likely to fail (or buy new stock if it 
appears likely to succeed).60 In support of this view, Peter Tufano’s empirical study 
shows that firms whose managers hold more stock have better corporate risk 
management policies.61 
The second type of incentive to take excessive risks involves short-termism, 
which happens when managers are able to realize a short-term increase in profits at 
the expense of latent and excessive risks of an implosion later on.62 In this case, 
managers do not need inside information about if and when the excessive risk will 
translate into an actual implosion. Instead, if the short-term stock price increase is 
significant enough, the subsequent and consistent unloading of a significant amount 
of stock might suffice to render such a strategy profitable for managers. In support 
of this view, a recent study suggests that incentives created by managerial freedom 
to unload large fractions of stock-based incentives played a role in the risk-taking 
decisions of the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during 
the years preceding the firms’ meltdown.63 
Effective SOPs would require managers to hold their firm stock for the long 
term rather than selling the stock quickly before the latent risk materializes and the 
value plummets. This would prevent managers from avoiding the potential future 
decline in stock price. 
Because of their potential importance in regard to risk mitigation, SOPs have 
become the most popular single policy that firms cite to show that they accomplish 
this goal. In 2010, the SEC required companies for the first time to discuss the level 
of risk inherent in their compensation programs within their proxy statements. 
Having SOPs was the most commonly cited policy (almost 60% in proxy filings of 
one hundred companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater),64 ahead of 
strategies that are directly designed to discourage undue risk, such as the balance of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. See Chen et al., supra note 10. 
 61. See generally Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk 
Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097 (1996). 
 62. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 274 (explaining that the ability of executives at 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to unload their stock in the years leading to the financial 
crisis provided them with incentives to seek improvements in short-term results even at the 
cost of an elevated risk of an implosion in the future). 
 63. Id. However, commentators disagree on whether poor incentives contributed to the 
crisis. See, e.g., Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit 
Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 22–23 (2011) (stating that bank performance during the recent 
credit crisis is not related to CEO incentives before the crisis). 
 64. See Equilar, Inc., supra note 9 (reporting that, among proxy filings of one hundred 
companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater, tying long-term performance was 
the most cited general strategy for mitigation of risk. Under this broad category, many of 
such companies cited SOPs as a key element in reducing their risk. The second-greatest 
percentage, 59% of companies, specifically disclosed that their SOPs contributed to their 
mitigation of risk.). 
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short-term and long-term incentives compensation, or policies like excess-pay 
clawbacks65 and hedging prohibition.66 
In addition to the goals that firms declare for their SOPs, these policies are 
worth examining for three more reasons. First, they should help to tie pay to 
performance. Second, other rules, policies, norms, incentives, or mechanisms that 
could prevent managers from prematurely unloading stock are insufficient. Third, 
SOPs cost less than other policies that constrain managerial stock unloading. 
D. SOPs Help To Tie Pay to Performance 
Because they can prevent managers from personally avoiding the negative 
consequences of their firms’ stock implosion, SOPs create an important link between 
pay and performance. When poor-performing managers are allowed to freely unload 
their stock, they may avoid taking a loss if they sell their stock before its price declines. 
Absent SOPs, managers who perform poorly may not only avoid losses but also 
generate personal profits. First, as I explained in the previous subpart, excessively 
risky strategies can generate profits for managers who may sell their stock 
quickly.67 Second, the ability to enter into hedging transactions may create even 
more opportunities for these managers to separate their pay from their performance. 
For example, managers who increase short-term profits and instill latent risks may 
not only sell their stock later but also hedge their risk ex ante by using a future 
contract, which stipulates that they will sell some or all of their stock in the future 
for a predetermined price.68 Because only the managers know about the latent risk 
of implosion down the road, the future contract would not reflect this risk. 
Therefore, these managers are able to lock up their personal short-term stock profits 
and hedge against a potential stock plummet. 
Finally, SOPs tie pay to risk management, which is an important aspect of 
performance. This link is created because SOPs, by limiting managers’ ability to 
unload stock, expose managers’ holdings to the long-term risk associated with the 
stock price. Without SOPs, managers can take advantage of their superior 
information by unloading their stock as a precaution against stock price volatility. 
Conversely, with SOPs (and because of their risk aversion), managers are encouraged 
to increase the stock price risk only if it creates an additional return that justifies it. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. Only 50% and 56% of these firms, respectively, cite the use of clawbacks and the balance 
of short-term and long-term incentives as part of their risk-management strategy. See id. 
 66. See supra note 31. 
 67. See, e.g., supra note 12 (discussing the perverse incentives that GM executive 
compensation incentives created not to fix the faulty ignition switches in its Chevrolet Cobalts). 
 68. See generally David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal 
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (2000) (noting that 
combining executive stock options together with derivatives raises a serious concern. 
Options are supposed to motivate better performance by tying pay to the stock price, but 
using derivatives for hedging can simulate a sale of such options without violating the 
executive contract with the firm. Then the incentive justification for option grants would no 
longer hold.). 
2015] CEO STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES 367 
 
E. The Need for SOPs Despite the Existence of Vesting Schedules 
Firms have universally adopted vesting schedules for their equity grants.69 Such 
schedules stipulate that managers may “earn” their stock options or restricted stock 
only in the future and only after certain conditions are met.70 Unless stock is 
earned, it is nontransferable and certainly cannot be sold by the manager. 
Nevertheless, well-construed SOPs are still important. Whereas both SOPs and 
vesting schedules impose unloading restrictions on stock that has not yet been 
earned by the manager, only SOPs define unloading restrictions for managerial 
stock that has already been vested. Restricting managerial freedom to unload vested 
stock is important both when managers sell their shares upon vesting and when 
they hold their shares to sell at a later date. 
First, if an executive sells all of his shares upon the vesting of his awards, his 
tangible alignment with shareholder interests will significantly decrease. For 
example, consider a newly appointed manager who is granted a fixed amount of 
stock every year, which vests in three equal annual installments.71 This manager, 
who sells all of his stock incentives upon their vesting, is expected to sell 
two-thirds of his total stock awards by his fifth anniversary. Going forward, the 
ratio of stock incentives that he unloads will increase even further.72 
Without SOPs, replenishing such stock incentives is very expensive. This is 
because, on average, stock-based compensation has reached an all-time high of 
roughly 80% of total pay for executives, and such stock vests over a period of only 
three to four years.73 Consequently, in order to replenish its CEO’s stock 
incentives, the average S&P 500 firm will have to grant its executive new stock 
worth almost $7 million per year. 
If the firm wants to avoid incurring such a significant cost, it would be better off 
imposing an SOP rather than extending its stock vesting schedules. Stretching 
vesting schedules increases the period in which options or restricted stock do not 
belong to the manager, thus making it costly for the manager who incurs the costs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See EQUILAR, INC., 2014 EQUITY TRENDS REPORT 15–17 (2014), available at 
http://info.equilar.com/rs/equilar/images/equilar-2014-equity-trends-report.pdf. 
 70. For time-based vesting, all vesting periods are at least one year in length and a 
three-year vesting period is the most common. For performance equity, long-term 
performance metrics are the most common condition for vesting, with a growing popularity 
of time-based vesting restrictions following such performance periods. See id. at 14–16. 
 71. Such a vesting schedule is in line with the common practice for vesting schedules. 
For example, graded stock and option awards in S&P 1500 firms both had average vesting 
periods of 3.6 years. See id. at 4. 
 72. If, for example, his annual stock grant is 100 shares, he will hold 200 unvested 
shares at his fifth-year anniversary and will sell 400 shares by then. Going forward, every 
following year he will sell another 100 shares and be granted the same amount of unvested 
stock. Therefore, the amount of unvested stock he holds will remain 200 but the amount of 
stock sales will increase by 100 shares every year. 
 73. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14; EQUILAR, INC., supra note 69, at 16 (reporting that 
a three-year cliff and three- and four-year graded vesting schedules are the most popular 
vesting periods). 
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associated with the extended risk of never earning his unvested stock.74 
Additionally, the manager will lose the time value of money resulting from pushing 
his vesting date forward. Conversely, by requiring the manager to hold his 
already-vested stock for the long term, an SOP merely limits the manager’s ability 
to sell stock he already owns. Thus, imposing SOPs is cheaper than extending 
vesting periods because it does not impose the extra risk associated with the 
possibility that a future receipt of stock ownership rights will not occur. These extra 
costs may be rolled over to shareholders.75 
Second, when the manager does not routinely unload his stock incentives upon 
vesting, well-construed SOPs become even more important because their 
effectiveness in attaining the goals discussed earlier in this Part increases. For 
example, unlike a manager who sells his stock upon vesting, a manager who 
consistently avoids selling his vested stock76 may be more tempted to push his firm 
to take excessive risks. If the gamble pans out and he keeps all of his vested stock, 
its value will appreciate more than if he had sold some of it. But if the unnecessary 
corporate adventure does not succeed, the manager will be able to avoid taking part 
in his shareholders’ loss by quickly unloading the considerable amount of vested 
stock that he still holds. 
Consider David Zucker, Midway Games CEO. Between December 19, 2006, 
and January 6, 2007, Zucker sold a total of 650,000 Midway Games shares for 
$12.9 million. Between mid-December 2006 and late February 2007, Midway 
Games stock lost almost 60% of its value.77 Unfortunately, Zucker is not the only 
executive to unload a massive amount of stock when gambles do not seem to pan 
out. The top five executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash 
flows of about $1.1 billion and $850 million, respectively, from stock sales during 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. A manager incurs a significant risk that his unvested stock will never vest for 
several reasons. For time-vested stock, the manager is not certain that he will remain with 
the firm until such time lapses. This is a significant risk because the average CEO tenure 
today is only eight years. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 26. For performance-based 
unvested stock, the manager is not certain that he will meet the performance criteria, which 
are often largely dependent on factors beyond the manager’s control, such as stock market 
performance, competitors’ performance, and pure luck. 
 75. A similar idea is that a shift of risk from the shareholders to a risk-averse CEO will 
result in more compensation being paid by the shareholders to the CEO.  See generally, e.g., 
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but 
How, HARV. BUS. REV., May 1990, at 138 (indicating that a shift of such risk, by tying more 
pay to performance, may be desirable despite the increase in CEO pay). 
 76. My study shows that many CEOs keep significant amounts of their vested stock and, 
more specifically, that the median S&P 500 CEO holds roughly $14 million worth of his 
vested stock incentives. 
 77. Jane Sasseen, A Closer Look at Trades by Top Brass: Some Execs May Be Abusing 
an SEC ‘Safe Harbor’ Rule on Insider Stock Sales, BUS. WK., NOV. 13, 2006, at 40 
(describing how Zucker and other executives took advantage of the SEC rule known as a 
10b5-1 plan to sell shares without facing insider-trading charges). Despite several conditions 
that such plans should meet, the article cites evidence that executives who set up such plans 
appear to be earning outsize gains. 
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the eight years preceding their firms’ colossal crashes in 2008.78 Also, in a study of 
executive trading in over 1200 firms during a five-year period ending in January 
2006, Alan Jagolinzer found that insiders regularly sell on inside information and 
thereby consistently generate above-market returns.79 
Finally, regardless of whether the manager sells some of his vested stock, 
restricting the sale of vested stock is more effective in changing managerial 
incentives than restricting the unloading of unvested stock. Vested stock is worth 
more for the manager than unvested stock because, as discussed before, stock vesting 
is uncertain. Therefore, the manager’s inability to sell his vested stock when its value 
decreases is more costly for him than refraining from selling an identical amount of 
his unvested stock. In turn, a manager who is subject to effective SOPs will have a 
greater incentive to avoid a long-term depreciation of his stock price compared to a 
manager who is merely restricted by his vesting schedules. 
F. The Insufficiency of Other Tools That Could Prevent Managers 
from a Quick Stock Unwinding 
In addition to SOPs and vesting schedules, there are other rules, policies, norms, 
and incentives that could theoretically prevent managers from quickly unloading 
their shares. However, such tools are insufficient to restrict the unloading of 
managerial stock. 
The most important of these alternatives is the ability of institutional 
shareholders and directors to exert informal pressure to hinder executives’ stock 
unwinding.80 There is evidence that institutional shareholders convey their views 
on executive compensation to selected boards of directors privately.81 Institutions 
also use informal negotiations backed by the threat of forcing a shareholder vote, 
filing shareholder proposals, launching “Just Vote No” campaigns, and using other 
activist efforts as a way to pry concessions out of companies.82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 260. In response, Fahlenbrach and Stulz suggest 
that bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during 
the crisis; however, even Fahlenbrach and Stulz do not deny consistent and comprehensive 
selling by executives of their own firm’s equity. See Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 63. 
 79. Alan D. Jagolinzer, Sec Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 
224, 232 (2009). 
 80. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992). 
 81. See James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional 
Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 758 (1995). 
 82. See Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts 
to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 167 (1995) (noting that “[l]arge private 
investors, such as Kirk Kerkorian, and their influence on the operations of some of 
America's largest corporations offer examples of investor power short of any vote or sale of 
stock”). Now, when shareholders are entitled to a nonbinding “Say on Pay” vote on 
executive compensation, they have more leverage to informally negotiate with management. 
See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1999) (noting that since the 
stratospheric increases in CEO pay of the 1990s, “[o]utraged investors have made their 
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Among other mechanisms that could incentivize or require managers to hold 
their firms’ stock for the long term are insider-trading rules. Practically, such rules 
limit managerial unwinding of stock to predetermined short “trading windows” 
following the release of quarterly earnings or, alternatively, to plans created before 
the executive was in possession of material nonpublic information.83 On top of 
these restrictions, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act aims to prohibit 
fraud by requiring insiders to disgorge any “short swing” profits realized from any 
purchase or sale of their firms’ securities within six months.84 In addition, federal 
tax rules encourage executives to defer the sale of their restricted stock and to defer 
the sale of their stock options.85 
We would also think that managers would not sell much of their stock because 
of their tendencies to be overconfident86 as well as their cognitive dissonance.87 
Because of their cognitive dissonance and overconfident tendencies, CEOs can be 
expected to hold more company stock than is desired from a portfolio 
diversification viewpoint. 
However, evidence shows that these existing mechanisms are not sufficient to 
prevent executives from quick stock unloading. A 2012 study suggests that most 
top executives at S&P 1500 firms sell equity at least once during their tenure, with 
the median sale equal to 15% of the executive’s total holdings of his firm’s stock.88 
Also, executives typically exercise their stock options years before those options 
                                                                                                                 
views known to corporate boards of directors using shareholder proposals, binding bylaw 
amendments, ‘Just Vote No’ campaigns, and other activist efforts”). 
 83. See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 463 (2011). 
 84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
 85. For restricted stock, tax payments are deferred to the date that the stock is sold, 
provided that the executive files a Section 83(b) election with the IRS within thirty days of the 
grant date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (2014). The grant of stock options is not a taxable event. If 
the options are “qualified” (if the executive holds the shares for at least one year after the 
exercise date and two years after the grant date of the stock) the employee pays nothing upon 
exercise and pays capital gains only when eventually selling the stock option. See Brian J. Hall 
& Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (2003). 
 86. See Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate 
Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2662 (2005) (reporting that CEOs are overconfident in the sense 
that they systematically overestimate the return to their investment projects, and hence they 
account for corporate investment distortions). 
 87. The theory of cognitive dissonance holds that contradictory beliefs compel the mind 
to acquire or invent new thoughts or beliefs, or to modify existing beliefs, so as to minimize 
the amount of dissonance between cognitions. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Therefore, cognitive dissonance might cause managers to 
reconcile their visions of themselves as successful managers with their fears of possible 
challenges along the way by holding a significant amount of their firms’ stock for the long 
term. Doing so would create new cognitions within consistent belief systems, according to 
which (despite the challenges that they might face along the way) managers could believe 
that their good abilities as managers would create value in the long term. A large body of 
evidence from applied psychology shows that corporate executives routinely overestimate 
their abilities. See generally, e.g., Malmendier & Tate, supra note 86. 
 88. See Ladika, supra note 19. 
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expire, and almost all of the shares acquired through option exercises are 
immediately sold.89 
G. The Low Costs of SOPs 
Theoretically, SOPs could be quite costly for shareholders. First, SOPs could 
inflict liquidity costs on managers who need more cash in hand. Second, they could 
force managers to hold undiversified personal securities portfolios and hence expose 
managers to unnecessary idiosyncratic risk.90 In both cases, the costs would be rolled 
over to the shareholders. Finally, SOPs could inflict direct costs on shareholders by 
discouraging managers from taking necessary and appropriate risks.91 
However, in reality, SOPs impose low costs. There are practical and theoretical 
reasons for this conclusion. As a practical matter, my data from this study reveal 
that the average S&P 500 CEO voluntarily holds almost three times his SOP 
threshold, or some $14 million of his firm’s stock.92 This indicates that CEOs 
typically choose to hold significant amounts of their firms’ stock despite the costs 
associated with such activity. Theoretically, the high personal wealth of S&P 500 
CEOs, resulting in part from their high compensation levels, can explain why their 
voluntary choice to hold a significant amount of their firms’ stock costs them little 
in the way of diversification and liquidity. Wealthy people tolerate risk 
significantly better than others because a marginal loss of wealth reduces their 
utility less than it does for less affluent people.93 In addition, their need for liquidity 
is relatively low because their marginal propensity to consume is low and more of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 176–77 (noting studies that demonstrate 
executives’ widespread freedom to unwind early, and executives’ tendency to exercise their 
options and sell the underlying shares well before the options’ expiration). 
 90. For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts that optimal diversification of 
risk should be measured relative to a comprehensive “market portfolio” that includes all 
traded financial assets as well as human capital and other assets. Therefore, managers, who 
have their human capital invested in the firm, should hold a small fraction of their financial 
portfolio in the firms’ stock. See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A 
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). 
 91. One of the rationales for stock-based compensation (and especially option 
compensation) is to make risk-averse managers more likely to take risks so that their 
incentives will be better aligned with those of their typically risk-neutral shareholders. 
Because options value increases with firm volatility, they are purported to give executives 
incentives to increased risk-taking. See generally Randolph B. Cohen, Brian J. Hall & Luis 
M. Viceira, Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking? (Mar. 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/lviceira/cohallvic3.pdf. 
 92. I obtained such data from the most recent information posted on the SEC website by 
all S&P 500 firms as of August 4, 2010. I specifically recorded each CEO’s actual holdings 
from his firm’s “Common Stock and Total Stock-Based Holdings” table in its proxy statement, 
counting only such holdings recognized by the counting policy that applies to the CEO. 
 93. Almost three hundred years ago, Nicholas Bernoulli argued that the marginal utility 
of wealth decreases as wealth increases, a view that is at the core of most conventional 
economic theory today. This view holds that the disutility from losing an additional dollar 
would decrease with wealth. ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 12–13 (2008). 
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their basic human needs have already been met. Also, CEOs’ cognitive dissonance 
and overconfident tendencies can exacerbate their propensity to hold stock even 
more than their low risk aversion and low liquidity needs can support.94 
II. THE WAVES OF SOP ADOPTIONS 
The importance of SOPs was not widely recognized in the 1990s, so their 
adoptions lagged behind the tectonic surge in stock-based compensation. 
Specifically, only about 35% among the top 250 companies disclosed SOPs in 
2001.95 Managers took advantage of their freedom to unload their incentive 
compensation. For example, when managers exercised options to acquire stock, 
they sold nearly all of it. Consequently, the dramatic boom in stock-based pay did 
not translate into a significant increase in managerial ownership.96 
The corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 emphasized the importance of SOPs. 
This recognition was triggered by the massive stock sale of former Enron president 
Jeffery Skilling. Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August 2001, and shortly 
thereafter sold large blocks of his Enron stock before Enron declared bankruptcy.97 
Skilling was later convicted of multiple federal felony charges relating to Enron’s 
financial collapse and is now serving a twenty-four-year, four-month prison 
sentence.98 The corporate scandals and increased investor attention that followed, 
coupled with SEC requirements to increase transparency of compensation 
disclosure, led to a surge in the number of formal SOPs in 2002.99 Specifically, 
49% of Fortune 250 companies disclosed formal SOPs for their executives in 2002, 
representing a 37% increase from 2001.100 
As recognition of the need for SOPs gained traction, pro-business organizations, 
such as the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, declared SOPs to 
be a “best practice.”101 In addition, a 2003 report by The Conference Board (the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See supra notes 86–87. 
 95. See FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES: PREVALENCE AND DESIGN 
OF EXECUTIVE AND DIRECTOR OWNERSHIP POLICIES AMONG THE TOP 250 COMPANIES 5 (2003), 
available at http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/FWC_Stock_Ownership_09.03.pdf. 
 96. See Ofek & Yermack, supra note 48, at 1383. 
 97. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Former Head of Enron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2001, at C1; Enron CEO Skilling Quits, CNN MONEY (Aug. 14, 2001, 5:16 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2001/08/14/companies/enron/; Enron Files for Bankruptcy, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2001, 5:08 AM),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1688550.stm. 
 98. Carrie Johnson, Skilling Gets 24 Years for Fraud at Enron; Former Workers Tell of 
Hard Times Over Lost Jobs, Retirement Savings, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 99. See FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., supra note 95, at 5. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See THE ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2007) (The Chamber of Commerce endorsed the hold-past-
retirement Aspen Principles, which state that “senior executives [should] hold a significant 
portion of their equity-based compensation for a period beyond their tenure.”); BUS. 
ROUNDTABLE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY 1 (2003); CFA 
CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, BREAKING THE 
SHORT-TERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, 
ASSET MANAGERS, INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE 9 
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leading independent business research organization in the United States) endorsed 
SOPs, stating that the long-term focus they promote “may help prevent companies 
from artificially propping up stock prices over the short term to cash out options 
and making other potentially negative short-term decisions.”102 This increased 
recognition of SOPs’ importance resulted in their prevalence among Fortune 250 
firms reaching 69.7% in 2005103 and 82.1% in 2008.104 
The 2008–09 financial crisis made the need to adopt SOPs unavoidable.105 
Prominent government officials made public statements urging firms to adopt such 
policies,106 and the federal government prescribed strict SOPs for all Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients.107 Since then, institutional shareholders 
have used this momentum to exert unprecedented pressure on firms, urging them to 
adopt SOPs and submitting numerous stockholder proposals.108 Even the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest public pension fund in the 
United States, has declared that SOPs should be adopted universally.109 
The world’s leading provider of proxy voting and corporate governance 
services, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),110 has supported shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
(2006) (recommending that companies require executives and directors to hold meaningful 
amounts of stock so that it is “economically material to the individual that a company 
succeed in the long-term”). 
 102. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2003). 
 103. EQUILAR, INC., 2007 EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES REPORT 3 (2008). 
 104. EQUILAR, INC., 2009 EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES REPORT 5 (2010). 
 105. This consensus was formed despite disagreements about the causes of crisis. See 
supra note 63. 
 106. See supra note 3. 
 107. Specifically, the Treasury regulations preclude TARP recipient executives from 
cashing out any of the stock they receive before their TARP funds are repaid. See 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012). 
 108. For example, shareholder proposals seeking to require executives to adopt strict 
SOPs were the second most frequent compensation-related topic in 2013.  “Thirty-four such 
proposals have been voted on . . . , receiving average support of 24.4%.” Memorandum from 
Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season 8 (July 9, 
2013). The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations has been 
particularly active in filing stockholder proposals pursuant to Section 14a-8 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, encouraging companies to adopt SOPs. It has filed such 
proposals in a handful of TARP companies including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank 
of New York Mellon. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 79 
(Mar. 15, 2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 130 (Mar. 12, 2010); 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 40 (Mar. 31, 2010). For 
stockholder proposals in non-TARP firms, see, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement 
(Form DEF 14A) 48 (Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing a stockholders proposal pushing Dow 
Chemical to adopt a policy requiring that senior executives retain at least 75% of net 
after-tax shares acquired through equity compensation programs until two years following 
the termination of their employment). 
 109. THE CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  68 (2010) (stating that “equity ownership guidelines and 
holding requirements should be an integral component of company’s equity plan and 
overall compensation philosophy”). 
 110. “For nearly 30 years, ISS has been the leading provider of governance research to 
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pressure. It has done so by (1) advising shareholders to vote for stockholder 
proposals that push companies to adopt SOPs,111 (2) rewarding firms that have 
SOPs on its newly debuted risk assessment system,112 and (3) recommending that 
shareholders vote on “Say-on-Pay” for firms with SOPs.113 Because ISS has a 
tremendous influence on firms, its support in shareholder pressure is expected to 
play a decisive role in pushing firms to adopt SOPs.114 
Leading business executives, such as Goldman Sachs’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein, 
have come up with their own proposals to adopt strong SOPs,115 and leading 
                                                                                                                 
institutional investors . . . [serving] approximately 39,000 companies across 115 countries.” 
Governance Advisory Services, ISS GOVERNANCE, http://www.issgovernance.com
/governance-solutions/governance-advisory-services/. 
 111. See RISKMETRICS GRP., 2010 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 51–52 
(2010), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/RMG_2010_US_Summary
Guidelines20100225.pdf. 
 112. Such a risk assessment system is called Governance Risk Indicators (GRId). GRId, 
which debuted on March 10, 2010, allows investors to assess their firms’ level of corporate 
governance risk. Scores are based on each company’s policy relative to what ISS views as 
“best practice” in the relevant global market. Answers are converted into numerical values 
using a grading system determined by ISS, and the results are converted into overall scores and 
levels of concern (e.g., low, medium, and high) in each of four areas. Generally, GRId’s 
scoring for a question will be based on a scale of “–5” to “+5,” with “0” being a neutral score. 
Scores are then normalized on a 100-point scale (e.g., 0 to 100). GRId includes twenty-eight 
compensation indicators, four of which exclusively discuss SOPs. Companies failing to 
disclose, or explicitly saying that they will not disclose, receive the lowest score on GRId, 
thereby receiving higher corporate governance risk assessment. See Hewitt, supra note 5. 
 113. Current ISS proxy voting summary guidelines urge shareholders to favor firms with 
robust SOPs when they cast their votes on Say-on-Pay. The guidelines state that shareholders 
should consider robust SOPs as an important factor that mitigates the impact of risky pay 
incentives. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. INC., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING 
SUMMARY GUIDELINES 40 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file
/files/ISS2014USSummaryGuidelines.pdf. 
 114. For example, in 2012 firms fortunate enough to receive an ISS “for” recommendation 
on Say-on-Pay received 95% shareholder support, whereas firms that received an “against” 
recommendation received only 65% support. John D. England, Say on Pay Soul-Searching 
Required at Proxy Advisory Firms, in PAY GOVERNANCE LLC, EXECUTIVE PAY AT A TURNING 
POINT: DEMONSTRATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE & OTHER BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 65, 65–66 (Ira T. Kay ed., 2nd ed. 2012). Therefore, companies often tailor their 
policies to meet ISS guidelines, and firms lobby for ISS support to fend off shareholder 
proposals. The relentless efforts that former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carli Fiorina has made to 
gain ISS support in the Hewlett-Packard-Compaq merger demonstrates the decisive importance 
of ISS. See Pui-Wing Tam & Gary McWilliams, H-P Garners Major Endorsement of Deal: 
ISS Advisory Firm Backs Acquisition of Compaq; Vote Seen as Still Close, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 
2002, at A3 (reporting that “many money-management firms take ISS’s reports into account 
before voting in a proxy battle”). 
 115. In a 2010 hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Blankfein declared 
that senior executive officers should be required to retain the bulk of the stock they receive 
until they retire and that stock delivery schedules should continue to apply after the 
individual has left the firm. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FIRST PUBLIC 
HEARING 6–11 (2010) (statement of Chairman and CEO Lloyd C. Blankfein of Goldman 
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stringent requirements on CEOs compared to the other members of the executive 
team or the nonemployee directors.  
I obtained most of my data from the most recent information posted on the SEC 
website by all S&P 500 firms as of August 4, 2010. The SOP terms I collected 
from the firms’ “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” chapters of their proxy 
statements are the following: declared goals, target thresholds, counting policies, 
phase-in periods, and sanctions. In order to analyze the firms’ counting policies, I 
coded each policy according to its counting of the following parameters: vested 
stock, vested options, deferred compensation, unvested stock, and unvested 
options. I further used each firm’s proxy statement to record CEO actual holdings, 
which I obtained from the “Common Stock and Total Stock-Based Holdings” 
tables, counting only the stock-based holdings that apply to the CEO. 
I also relied on some data outside the information disclosed in the firms’ proxy 
statements, such as data available on the firms’ websites. In addition, I recorded share 
prices from Google Finance and determined CEO tenure for each firm using data I 
obtained from the Compustat ExecuComp database also as of August 4, 2010. 
Finally, I calculated the percentage of vested equity that each SOP allows its 
CEO to unwind. I did so by applying the following formula: 
(vested equity – target threshold + min (target threshold, unvested 
equity that may be counted for satisfying the SOP)) / vested equity 
IV. THE DESIGN OF SOPS 
Before analyzing the ineffectiveness and lack of transparency of SOPs, it is 
important to explain how these policies are designed. I find that 94% of recent 
SOPs disclose a target ownership framework while only 6% invoke a framework 
that requires ongoing stock retention. 
A. The Target Ownership Framework 
This common SOP framework calls for CEOs119 to maintain minimum 
ownership of their firms’ stock, typically valued at a certain multiple of their base 
salary, as long as they serve in their current positions. The target threshold 
framework also includes a counting policy, which describes the type of stock that 
may be counted to satisfy its specified ownership threshold. Finally, the framework 
contains a phase-in period term, which specifies the number of years the executive 
has to attain his or her required stock threshold.120 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. SOPs and their target thresholds generally apply to senior executive officers and all 
nonemployee directors. Because my analysis focuses on CEOs, I ignore all other SOP 
objectives, such as target ownership thresholds for nonemployee directors that are specified 
as a multiple of their regular annual cash retainer. 
 120. A detailed SOP is described in Johnson & Johnson’s 2010 proxy statement: “[T]he 
Chairman/CEO is required to directly or indirectly own Company Common Stock equal in 
value to five times his or her annual salary. . . . Stock ownership for the purpose of these 
guidelines does not include shares underlying stock options. Individuals subject to these 
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Almost two-thirds (62%) of CEOs are allowed to unload all of their vested stock 
immediately,125 and the dollar amount of this capability is significant. In particular, 
half of CEOs are allowed to sell more than $14 million worth of their vested stock 
(which equals to more than 2.75 times their SOP target threshold), and 35% of 
CEOs are allowed to sell more than $30 million worth of their vested stock. 
Yet there is considerable variation in the effectiveness of SOPs. While the vast 
majority of policies are extremely ineffective, there are some that do not allow 
CEOs to sell significant amounts of their vested stock.126 A few points are worth 
noting here. First, these strong policies are driven by the use of the uncommon, 
ongoing retention framework.127 Second, among standard SOP frameworks, those 
that tend to be effective impose strict counting policies—namely, they do not 
recognize unvested stock.128 Third, and to a lesser extent, some stringent SOPs do 
not have strict counting policies or a retention framework, but rather use high base 
salary multiples.129 Lastly, some SOPs appear effective because of circumstantial 
factors that are unrelated to their design, such as CEOs who choose to keep small 
amounts of vested stock.130 Such relatively small stock holdings strongly correlate 
with a short CEO tenure. 
Some SOPs allow CEOs to unload a significant percentage of their vested stock 
not because those policies are weak but because those CEOs hold significant 
amounts of vested stock voluntarily, significantly above what their SOPs require 
them to hold.131 In such cases, however, it is hard to think of a compelling 
explanation for why these SOPs are necessary. Even more puzzling, it is hard to 
explain why firms advertise these unnecessary policies so aggressively. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. This result is based on a sample of 155 CEOs who already have to comply with their 
SOPs and whose policies can be evaluated. Of all the firms included in the S&P 500 index, 
only 283 firms disclose counting policies. Therefore, only these firms’ policies can be 
evaluated. Of the CEOs of these firms, only 147 CEOs have phased-in policies; another eight 
firms disclose retention policies that do not require phase-in terms. 
 126. Such effective SOPs are mostly those of financial firms, including Goldman Sachs 
and JPMorgan. See supra Part IV.B. 
 127. See supra Part IV.B.  
 128. Aetna, an American managed health care company, established a stringent counting 
policy. It strictly defines ownership as including “shares owned and vested stock units but 
not stock options or [Stock Appreciation Rights].” Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A) 51 (Apr. 12, 2010). 
 129. General Dynamics, an American aerospace and defense company, established a 
stringent SOP requiring its officers to “retain Common Stock until they own outright shares 
with a market value ranging from eight to 15 times their base salary depending on the 
officer’s position.”  Gen. Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Mar. 19, 
2010). A fifteen-times-base-salary multiple for the CEO is extremely high considering the 
norm of five-times multiple for CEOs. See supra Figure 2. 
 130. For example, Hershey CEO David West holds, as of March 8, 2010, only 2.7 times his 
base salary and hence is required to accumulate shares equal to five times his base salary by 
October 2, 2012. The Hershey Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 61 (Mar. 22, 2010). 
 131. Michael Dell, Dell’s founder, chairman, and CEO, holds more than 11% of the 
company’s stock, which amounts to 461 times his holding requirement. Therefore, his SOP 
allows him to sell more than 99% of his stock. See Dell Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEA 
14A) 38, 48 (May 27, 2010). 
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Now, I analyze how SOPs fail to require CEOs to hold on to their firms’ stock 
as a function of policy design. 
A. Failure To Adopt the Ongoing Retention Framework 
Despite the significantly enhanced effectiveness that the ongoing retention 
framework provides, my analysis shows that only about 4% of SOPs use holding 
period requirements and less than 2% employ a stock retention approach. These 
SOPs are significantly more effective than common SOPs as they allow CEOs to 
sell a dramatically lower percentage of their vested stock. 
Consider the rare retention SOP adopted by Goldman Sachs: 
[E]ach of our Senior Executives . . . is required . . . for so long as he 
holds such position, to retain sole beneficial ownership of a number of 
shares of Common Stock equal to at least 75% of the shares he has 
received under our [Stock Incentive Plan] since becoming a Senior 
Executive.132 
As opposed to the common target ownership framework SOP, which uses a 
five-times-base-salary multiple, the target threshold of Goldman’s SOP is 
equivalent to more than ninety-five times the $600,000 base salary of its chairman 
and CEO Lloyd Blankfein. This multiple will increase over time as soon as 
Blankfein, who started serving as Goldman’s senior manager in April 2002, is 
awarded more stock-based incentives. 
Consider the rare holding-period approach endorsed by Exxon Mobil’s SOP: 
“50 percent of each grant is restricted for five years;” and “[t]he balance is 
restricted for 10 years or until retirement, whichever is later.”133 
For Rex Tillerson, who was elected chairman and CEO of Exxon Mobil in 2006, 
the stock subject to SOP is equal to thirty-nine times his base salary, compared to 
only five-times-base-salary multiple for the median CEO. Moreover, Tillerson’s 
percentage of vested stock free to unwind is as low as 12%, dramatically lower than 
the 100% freedom to unwind for the median CEO.134 
 The vast majority of SOPs that employ a target ownership framework not only 
fail to require ongoing retention of stock after their ownership levels are met but 
also fail to invoke an RHT approach, which guides CEOs to retain stock before 
such levels are attained. RHT policies use retention rates ranging from 25% to 
100%, with almost half of them (twenty-one policies) requiring a 100% retention 
rate.135 Dun & Bradstreet discloses such an exceptional policy: “[A]ll executives 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., supra note 50, at 41. Citigroup, JPMorgan, and 
Morgan Stanley adopted similar policies. See Citigroup Inc., supra note 108, at 64; 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 108, at 26–27; Morgan Stanley, supra note 116, at 19. 
 133. Exxon Mobil Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEA 14A) 30 (Apr. 13, 2010) 
(emphasis in original). 
 134. Id. 
 135. The retention rates of the remaining twenty-six RHT policies are distributed as 
follows: seven policies require a 75% rate, nine require a 50% rate, two require a 30% rate, 
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The impact of counting unvested stock on SOP effectiveness should not be 
surprising. The average SOP requires the CEO to hold five times his base salary in 
five years, counting both unvested and vested stock to satisfy this threshold. CEOs 
earn, on average, a $1 million annual base salary, and each year they receive some 
$6 million grant of stock that vests gradually over three years.139 Thus, starting in the 
beginning of their third year of stock grants, CEOs will hold, on average, $12 million 
worth of unvested stock, which they do not own yet but can nevertheless apply 
toward their average $5 million SOP requirement. Hence, the counting policy that 
recognizes unvested stock may easily render an SOP entirely ineffective. 
This focus on policies that allow the counting of unvested stock shows that such 
policies render most SOPs entirely ineffective for all levels of CEO tenure, even for 
CEOs who have not phased in yet. Also, the median amount of unvested stock 
exceeds SOPs’ target threshold for all levels of CEO tenure. Table 1 summarizes 
the pervasive power of counting unvested stock in rendering SOPs ineffective. 




Years after CEO 
phased in 








26 (–2) to 0 1.49 62% 
30 0 to 2 1.01 50% 
39 3 or more 1.26 62% 
95 All 1.16 58% 
Sample: Ninety-five SOPs that count unvested stock, disclose their phase-in policies, and 
give their CEOs two years or less to phase in. 
Dell, one of 164 firms that allow the counting of unvested stock, acknowledges 
that the pervasive market norm of counting unvested stock has influenced its 
decision to do the same.140 Dell explicitly indicates that its lax counting policy 
follows the market: 
Unvested restricted stock, [Restricted Stock Units] and 
[Performance-Based Restricted Stock Units] (earned) may be used to 
satisfy these minimum ownership requirements, but unexercised stock 
options and awards subject to a performance requirement may not. Dell 
believes these ownership guidelines to be in line with the prevalent 
ownership guidelines among peer companies.141 
                                                                                                                 
in 401(k) accounts, deferred compensation, and stock in trust accounts. 
 139. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14. 
 140. Despite the fact that Michael Dell holds more than 11% of the company’s stock, 
Dell’s other top executives and nonemployee directors can take advantage of the company’s 
ineffective SOP. 
 141. Dell Inc., supra note 131, at 38. 
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C. Lax Target Ownership Levels 
For most CEOs, SOP target ownership levels are lower than 50% of their annual 
total pay and even lower than their single-year stock-based compensation.142 Only 
3% of SOPs use a base salary multiple that requires CEOs to hold more than their 
single-year total pay. 
The common practice of lax target thresholds renders many SOPs futile as soon 
as they are adopted. According to a 2011 study, “71% of the CEOs already have a 
multiple larger than the target by the time the guidelines are initiated.”143 
D. Phase-In Policies Suspend Many SOPs 
Phase-in policies render 43% of SOPs inapplicable. The reason for this is that 
CEOs are expected to attain their target ownership levels only after serving five 
years in their positions. Because the median CEO tenure of S&P 500 CEOs in my 
survey is just 5.01 years,144 almost half of CEOs are not required to hold any stock 
yet, solely because of their firms’ feckless phase-in policies. In addition, virtually 
all phase-in policies do not invoke an RHT approach, which requires an ongoing 
accumulation of stock before CEOs hit their target ownership thresholds. 
The bottom line result I reported earlier, according to which almost two-thirds of 
CEOs are allowed to unload their stock immediately, is underestimated as it does 
not take into account the 128 CEOs who have not phased in yet. When those CEOs 
are included, the percentage of CEOs who are allowed to immediately unload all of 
their vested stock and still comply with their SOPs jumps to almost 80%.145 
E. CEOs Are Allowed To Nullify Their SOPs Through Hedging 
A “perfect hedge” nullifies the incentives provided by holding stock pursuant to 
an SOP. It does so by stripping the upside and downside risks associated with stock 
price movements in exchange for a predetermined cash flow that is not affected by 
the firm’s future stock price or performance. Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon document 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. This outcome results from the fact that some 80% of SOPs require CEOs to hold 
five times their base salary or less, while the average S&P 500 CEO is paid a $1 million base 
salary and his total compensation is some $10.1 million, $8.1 million of which is in the form 
of stock-based compensation. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14. 
 143. Ying Cao, Zhaoyang Gu & Yong George Yang, Adoption of Executive Ownership 
Guidelines: A New Look 13 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596503. 
 144. This finding is in line with the fact that the average tenure of a departing S&P 500 
CEO in the United States was only eight years in 2010. THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 26. 
 145. The calculation goes as follows: the population of all SOPs that can be evaluated 
(those with clear counting policies) is 283, compared with only 155 policies of CEOs who 
have phased in. Ninety-six out of the 155 phased-in CEOs, as well as the 128 non-phased-in 
CEOs, are allowed to sell all their stock immediately. The total of 128 plus 96 divided by 
283 (79.2%) is the sum of the CEOs who are allowed to sell 100% of their vested stock and 
still be in compliance with their SOPs. 
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that many managers use zero-cost collars and equity swaps146 to hedge the risk 
associated with their equity holdings.147 Managers even possess some timing 
abilities; that is, they can initiate hedging transactions immediately following large 
price run-ups and prior to poor earnings announcements.148 
To demonstrate how a zero-cost collar transaction may nullify an SOP, consider 
an SOP that requires an executive to hold 50,000 shares of his firm’s stock for the 
long term; consider further that the stock currently trades at one hundred dollars. 
This leaves the executive exposed to future losses of up to $5 million if his firm’s 
stock price drops and poised to earn an unlimited potential profit if that price 
increases. This balance between potential gains and losses should incentivize him 
to avoid taking excessive risks and to work hard to maximize the long-term stock 
price. However, if he wishes to fully hedge his SOP stock by purchasing a 
zero-cost collar, he can buy 50,000 put options and sell 50,000 call options with a 
strike price of one hundred dollars for each option. This hedge fully protects him 
from any increase or decrease in his firm’s stock price because the exercise of the 
call (put) options will nullify any positive (negative) cash flow associated with any 
future increase (decrease) in stock price. The economic incentives provided by this 
hedge are equivalent to the sale of his 50,000 SOP stock. His SOP holdings 
therefore no longer provide him with any economic incentives.149 
I find that only the few SOPs that employ retention frameworks and another two 
SOPs that use the common target ownership framework do not count shares subject 
to hedging.150 Although firms are now required to disclose more of their 
executives’ derivative transactions,151 the law does not prohibit executives from 
hedging their stock. Therefore, they may freely weaken or undo their SOPs by 
entering into hedging transactions. 
My results for overall SOP ineffectiveness are probably again underestimated 
because I do not account for possible CEO hedging activity. A future work should 
analyze the impact of actual hedging transactions on the ineffectiveness of SOPs. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Zero-cost collar strategies involve the simultaneous purchase of a put option and 
sale of a call option covering the firm’s shares so that both costs cancel each other out. An 
equity swap is a financial derivative contract in which two parties agree to exchange a set of 
cash flows at set dates in the future. Equity swaps allow investors to exchange the future 
returns on their stock for the cash flow of another financial instrument, such as a debt 
instrument (e.g., the cash flows associated with the return of the London Interbank Offered 
Rate) or any other financial instrument, such as the S&P 500. See J. Carr Bettis, John M. 
Bizjak & Michael L. Lemmon, Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use 
of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 345, 345 (2001). 
 147. Id. at 359–71 (indicating that zero-cost collars and equity swaps involve high ranking 
insiders and cover over a third of their equity holdings). 
 148. Id. at 347. 
 149. See Schizer, supra note 68. 
 150. Firms that invoke retention policies also prohibit hedging by their executives. The 
two firms in my sample that employ the common target ownership framework and do not 
count hedged stock are Public Service Enterprise Group and SunTrust Banks. 
 151. See infra Part VI.C.1.b. 
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F. Lack of Sanctions 
Only rarely do SOPs disclose sanctions that may be imposed for breaching these 
policies. In particular, more than 90% of policies in my study, or 379, have not 
disclosed sanctions. A board of directors does not need a special authorization to 
penalize SOP violators, as it has an inherent prerogative to manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation.152 Still, having a binding sanction policy is important 
because, for a variety of financial, psychological, and social reasons, boards cannot 
be expected to initiate the penalizing of executives who breach the terms of their 
SOPs.153 Therefore, the lack of sanctions delivers an implicit message to investors 
that boards are not expected to take SOP violations seriously.154 In practical terms, 
it can mean that SOPs are rendered aspirational rather than binding. 
Moreover, the few disclosed sanctions generally do not impose meaningful 
penalties; most (twenty-eight of forty-five) merely impose a partial prohibition on 
future equity award sales,155 and many of them are framed in ways that leave such a 
penalty to the discretion of the board of directors. Only in a very few cases, as with 
Merck’s SOP, do firms penalize SOP violators by reducing their future equity grants.156 
G. Suggestive Language 
Many firms frame their SOPs in advisory rather than mandatory terms. That is, 
their policies are not phrased to require their top executives and directors to follow 
their SOPs but instead merely “call” their leadership team members to hold certain 
stock in their firms. For example, Archer Daniels Midland’s SOP states that “[t]he 
policy calls for members of senior management to own shares of common 
stock.”157 Such language, along with the scarcity of sanctions, indicates that many 
SOPs are not designed to be binding. 
VI. SOP INEFFECTIVENESS IS CAMOUFLAGED 
Firms camouflage the extreme ineffectiveness of their SOPs in three ways: first, 
they do not provide bottom-line information regarding the effectiveness of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (discussing the managing role of a 
board of directors). 
 153. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 23–44. 
 154. Jesse Fried and I report a similar pattern with voluntarily adopted clawback policies. 
See Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 737–38 (2011) 
(reporting that the vast majority of clawback policies adopted by S&P 500 firms leave 
discretion to boards to forgo recovering excess pay even when the executive receiving such 
pay committed misconduct). 
 155. Such an ineffective sanction is mentioned in Qualcomm’s SOP: “If a [Named 
Executive Officer] has not met the guidelines by the deadline, we will require that the NEO, 
upon a stock option exercise, hold at least 50% of the net shares remaining after required tax 
withholdings, until they meet the minimum guideline.” Qualcomm Inc., Proxy Statement 
(Form DEF 14A) 23 (Jan. 14, 2009). 
 156. Merck & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 31 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
 157. Archer Daniels Midland Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5 (Sept. 25, 2009). 
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policies; second, many do not disclose critical terms of their SOPs to their 
investors; and third, when they do disclose critical terms, the implications of those 
terms are not apparent. 
Firms manage to camouflage the ineffectiveness of their SOPs in part because the 
current disclosure rules, mandated by Regulation S-K,158 allow them to do so. Such 
rules merely require them to disclose their SOP objectives159 in their proxy statements 
and to provide a general description of their policies, including applicable amounts 
and forms of ownership.160 Firms may also disclose information not required by 
current disclosure rules. With SOPs, however, they seem to adopt a “lawyerly 
approach” and reveal only the information they are required to disclose. 
A. Firms Do Not Indicate the Overall Effectiveness of Their SOPs 
Firms do not disclose bottom-line information regarding the effectiveness of 
their SOPs. Specifically, they fail to report both the amount of vested stock that 
their CEOs are allowed to unload going forward and the scope of historical 
unwinding activity of stock recognized by their SOPs. 
1. SOPs Fail To Indicate the Amount of Vested Stock 
CEOs May Immediately Unload 
I find that recent disclosures in firms’ proxy statements fail to indicate the 
amount or the percentage of vested stock that CEOs may unwind according to their 
SOPs. Because this amount of stock reflects the amount of incentive that the CEO 
might have to deviate from SOP objectives, such information is the single most 
important indicator that should be disclosed in order to facilitate informed investor 
choice. In particular, as CEOs are allowed to sell more stock, their SOPs are less 
effective in aligning their incentives with those of their shareholders, in curbing 
their tendency toward excessive risk taking, and in incentivizing CEOs to focus on 
long-term value maximization. 
The lack of such disclosure not only is theoretically disturbing but also has a 
clear, practical importance. Hiding the bottom-line ineffectiveness of SOPs 
disguises the fact that most policies allow CEOs to sell all of the stock they own. 
Moreover, this flaw cannot be rectified by having shareholders calculate these 
numbers on their own. As I explain in subpart B below, even diligent and dedicated 
outsiders are often unable to produce the bottom-line effectiveness numbers for 
SOPs on their own. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(xiii) (2013). 
 159. Item 402(b)(1) requires that “the discussion shall describe . . . (i) [t]he objectives of 
the registrant’s compensation programs; [and] (ii) [w]hat the compensation program is 
designed to reward[.]” § 229.402(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2011). 
 160. Item 402(b)(2) states that “examples of such information may include, in a given 
case, among other things, the following: . . . (xiii) The registrant's equity or other security 
ownership requirements or guidelines (specifying applicable amounts and forms of 
ownership).” § 229.402(b)(2)(xiii) (2011). 
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2. Firms Fail To Disclose Unwinding Activity of Stock Counted for SOP Purposes 
Because SOP terms, such as counting policies, are commonly both vague and 
potentially destructive for the effectiveness of these policies, knowing the bottom 
line for actual unloading activity becomes very important. Unfortunately, investors 
are not provided with information regarding how much stock recognized for SOP 
purposes their CEOs unloaded in previous reporting periods. 
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs disclosure 
of stock-unloading activity related to insider trading, cannot substitute for specific 
disclosures regarding such activity recognized by SOPs. Although Section 16(a) 
requires CEOs, as well as other insiders, to report their individual stock purchases 
and sales on Form 4 within forty-eight hours of such activity161 and to file an 
annual statement of beneficial ownership of securities on Form 5,162 these 
disclosures do not present a full picture of the stock-unloading activity that may be 
counted for SOP purposes. This is because SOP counting policies commonly differ 
from the counting of securities under Section 16(a).163 
Knowing the historical unloading activity by CEOs of stock counted for their SOPs 
would help investors evaluate the effectiveness of SOPs. Such information does not 
only reflect the absolute strength of the policy but also the tendency of the CEO to take 
advantage of potential weaknesses of the policy in order to unload stock. Hence, it 
would help investors determine the need to modify the strength of such policies. 
B. Firms Do Not Disclose Critical Terms of Their SOPs 
Having shown that investors are not provided with an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of their SOPs, I now show that they are also not often provided with 
enough information—specifically, about critical terms that determine the 
functioning and effectiveness of these policies—to be able to form such an 
assessment on their own. 
1. Some 90% of SOPs Do Not Disclose Sanctions 
Only 45 of the 424 firms in this study that disclose their SOPs specify sanctions, 
which makes sanctions the least disclosed SOP term. Because Regulation S-K does 
not require sanctions be disclosed, investors do not know whether this 
nondisclosure is due to the lack of sanctions in the firms’ SOPs or to the firms’ 
choice not to disclose such sanctions. 
Leaving investors in the dark as to the existence of sanctions is troubling. As 
explained in Part V, the lack of binding sanctions sends a message that SOPs are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. See 17 CFR § 249.104 (2012). 
 162. See 17 CFR § 249.105 (2012). 
 163. For example, I find that SOP counting policies differ greatly in the type of stock 
they count. In addition to stock owned outright, they might include vested options, unvested 
options, deferred stock, performance shares, stock units, stock in trusts, or stock owned by 
family members. Section 16, in contrast, applies equally to all firms and requires reporting of 
transactions in all equity securities of the firm, including derivatives, that the reporting 
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Because counting policies are crucial in rendering SOPs ineffective, the 
nondisclosure of counting policies certainly precludes investors from evaluating their 
SOPs. Concern over this finding increases if one considers that such nondisclosure 
might present an adverse selection problem—namely, that firms that avoid revealing 
their counting policies do so because they have the least effective policies. Still, 
investors cannot simply assume that this is the case; rather, they need clear information. 
3. Some 20% of SOPs Do Not Disclose Phase-In Policies 
Almost one-fifth of SOPs do not disclose their phase-in policies. Unlike with 
counting policies, Regulation S-K does not provide any specific guidance for phase-in 
policy disclosure; instead, the applicable legal standard for such policies is a general 
materiality test, according to which firms should consider whether their phase-in 
policies should be disclosed as part of their general policy description.166 Many firms 
choose to avoid disclosing their phase-in policies despite the great importance of such 
disclosure for investors who are interested in evaluating the effectiveness of their 
SOPs. Such importance results from the fact that, as I reported in Part V.D, as many as 
43% of disclosed phase-in policies render SOPs inapplicable. 
Comparing the disclosure rates of various policies reveals a selective disclosure 
pattern: firms tend to be more aggressive in camouflaging critical provisions that may 
render their SOPs more ineffective and may even provide more valuable information 
to their investors. Based on my research, the most frequently hidden SOP component 
is sanctions, despite the fact that the lack thereof can render SOPs entirely toothless. 
The second most frequently hidden SOP component is counting policies, the 
nondisclosure of which renders SOPs ineffective in 58% of cases. Finally, the least 
frequently hidden component is phase-in policies, which provide the least valuable 
information for investors; this is because only 43% of these policies render SOPs 
ineffective and the variation across disclosed phase-in policies is the least significant. 
Because critical SOP terms tend to be camouflaged, SOPs have not been included 
in standard databases that financial economists use for research on executive 
compensation.167 This, in turn, makes it harder for researchers and professional 
investors alike to make a fast, systemic, and cheap assessment of these policies. 
C. When Firms Disclose Critical SOP Terms, the Functioning 
of Those Terms Is Not Apparent 
The discussion in subpart B highlighted that firms frequently withhold 
information about critical SOP terms that could allow investors to assess SOPs on 
their own. In this subpart, I explain that when firms do disclose critical terms of 
their SOPs, they do not indicate the impact of such terms on the effectiveness of 
their SOPs. In addition, some critical SOP terms are disclosed in an obscure way 
that might leave investors with the impression that these SOPs might not render 
policies ineffective. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 160. 
 167. For example, the popular S&P ExecuComp database does not include any of the 
SOP terms. 
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1. When Firms Disclose Critical SOP Terms, the Impact 
of Those Terms Is Not Apparent 
Firms commonly fail to disclose that some critical terms of their SOPs render 
these policies entirely ineffective or significantly cripple them. The most important 
examples are counting policies and hedging policies. 
a. Firms Fail To Disclose How Counting Unvested Stock Affects Their SOPs 
Despite the tremendous impact of counting policies on the effectiveness of 
SOPs, my study shows that firms never indicate how their counting policies affect 
the strength of their SOPs or whether allowing the counting of unvested stock 
renders a policy ineffective. For example, in describing its counting policy, UPS 
states that “[s]hares of class A common stock, deferred units and vested and 
unvested [Restricted Stock Units] and [Restricted Performance Units] are 
considered as owned for purposes of calculating ownership.”168 
But UPS does not acknowledge that recognizing unvested Restricted Stock 
Units (RSUs) and Restricted Performance Units (RPUs) renders its SOP entirely 
ineffective for its CEO. It specifically does not disclose that its counting policy 
allows its CEO to count his $12.3 million worth of unvested RSUs and RPUs to 
satisfy his $8.4 million SOP commitment in full. 
The detailed counting policy of KLA-Tencor suffers from a similar flaw: 
“Unexercised options and unearned performance shares or units do not count for 
purposes of measuring compliance with the ownership guidelines. The value of 
unvested restricted stock or stock units is included in measuring compliance.”169 
KLA-Tencor does not explain that this policy renders its SOP entirely 
ineffective for its CEO, nor does it mention that the unvested restricted stock units 
and the unvested performance share awards held by its CEO, Richard Wallace,170 
equal more than four times Wallace’s SOP threshold. The implication of this 
counting policy is that Wallace is in automatic compliance with his SOP without 
holding even a single stock that he owns. However, as with UPS, this material fact 
is not noted in the KLA-Tencor proxy statement. 
b. SOPs Fail To Indicate the Effect of Hedging on Their SOPs 
It is important for investors to know how a CEO’s actual hedging activity 
interferes with the economic incentives allegedly provided by the firm’s SOP stock. 
Firms argue that their SOPs tie managerial wealth to shareholder wealth over the long 
term and that this is the mechanism by which their SOPs mitigate risk and encourage 
long-term value creation.171 However, as I explained in Part V, CEOs may hedge 
their SOP stock and thereby nullify the incentives provided by those policies. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra note 18. 
 169. KLA-Tencor Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 59 (Sept. 27, 2012). 
 170. For Wallace’s unvested restricted stock units and unvested performance share 
awards, see id. at 41. 
 171. See supra notes 36–39. 
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Before the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which tightened the reporting obligations imposed 
on firms with regard to the hedging transactions of their directors or employees, firms 
were already required to report to the SEC any derivative transactions made by their 
executives.172 Section 955 of Dodd-Frank extended the hedging reporting requirements 
by requiring firms to disclose whether their directors and employees are permitted to 
hedge any decrease in market value of the company’s stock.173 
Still, firms are not required to—and never do—indicate how their managers’ stock 
hedging affects their SOPs. This is particularly important because, as I reported in 
Part V, only two firms in my sample do not count stock subject to hedging. 
Therefore, fully hedged stock held by an executive is counted to satisfy his or her 
SOP, but investors are kept in the dark regarding the existence of such stock. 
2. Critical SOP Terms Are Confusing 
The second reason why the functioning of critical SOP terms is not apparent is 
that the framing of such terms is confusing, as can be seen primarily in the 
disclosures of target ownership levels and of counting policies. 
a. Target Ownership Levels Are Typically Obscure 
The meaning of the term “salary” in describing the target ownership thresholds of 
SOPs is confusing. The average policy, as I reported in Part IV, requires CEOs to 
hold five times their base salary.174 However, some firms, such as UPS, use the term 
salary or annual salary to describe the base salary multiple of their CEOs’ target 
ownership levels.175 While for most employees salary means total compensation, it 
means only less than 10% of total compensation for the average S&P 500 CEO.176 
There is no a priori philological reason to assume that managers’ salary is 
different from their total compensation. The exclusion of the stock-based portion of 
executive pay from the definition of salary becomes even less intuitive when one 
considers the SOP objective to translate the dramatic increase in stock-based 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. Forms 3, 4, and 5, pursuant to Sections 16(a) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and Sections 30(h) and 38 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, require 
insiders to report holdings, acquisitions or dispositions of derivative securities. Specifically, 
Form 3 should be filed after a company’s IPO, and report insiders’ initial derivative 
securities holdings. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.103 (2013). Form 4 should be filed before the end of 
the second business day following the day on which an acquisition or a disposition of a 
derivative security has been executed. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (2013). Form 5 should be 
filed annually, reporting insiders’ derivative securities holdings. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.105 
(2013). For copies of the forms themselves, see Forms 3, 4, 5, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form345.htm. 
 173. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(j) (West 2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 174. I report only one firm, Chesapeake Energy, that includes the annual bonus as part of 
its SOP salary multiple. This inclusion increases its SOP salary multiple from five to fifteen 
times its CEO’s base salary. 
 175. The SOP of UPS states that “[t]arget ownership for the Chief Executive Officer is 
eight times annual salary.” United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra note 18. 
 176. In 2013, the average S&P 500 CEO was paid a total compensation of some $10.1 
million, while his base salary was $1 million. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14. 
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compensation into managerial ownership. Therefore, using the term salary is not 
only confusing but also likely to give investors an impression that their SOPs 
function more effectively than they actually do. 
b. Counting Policies Are Commonly Obscure 
It is important for investors to know unequivocally when their SOPs allow the 
counting of unvested stock. This is because counting unvested stock renders SOPs 
completely ineffective in almost 60% of the cases and significantly weakens them 
in the remaining 40%. 
Nonetheless, firms that count unvested stock commonly camouflage this fact. In 
particular, they frame the holding of unvested stock—stock not owned yet by the 
executive—as “ownership,” as evidenced by the counting policy of AK Steel: 
“‘[O]wnership’ includes . . . shares of Company restricted stock held directly by an 
Executive Officer, whether or not yet vested.”177 AK Steel uses the word ownership 
to describe unvested stock. Stating that ownership includes stock that is not yet 
owned by the executive might confuse investors and prevent them from realizing that 
such provisions significantly weaken SOPs and often render them entirely ineffective. 
VII. THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF SOP INEFFECTIVENESS AND CAMOUFLAGE 
Before proposing a regulatory reform to make SOPs transparent, it is important 
to explain why the ineffectiveness of SOPs, and especially the camouflaging of 
such ineffectiveness, is troubling. 
A. SOP Ineffectiveness Prevents These Policies from Achieving the 
Important Goals They Have Been Established To Attain 
Because they are so ineffectual, SOPs are not likely to affect managers’ 
incentives and behavior. I reported in Part V that SOPs allow two-thirds of CEOs to 
sell 100% of their vested stock immediately. Such CEOs are not any more likely to 
shy away from taking excessive risks than are managers who do not have SOPs. 
Similarly, SOPs do not curtail managers’ incentives to take other actions that those 
policies were designed to discourage. 
Evidence from the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis casts doubt upon 
the efficacy of SOPs in curtailing managers’ incentives to take excessive risks, 
even in the face of SOPs that are significantly more effective than recent ones. 
Specifically, at that time Lehman Brothers178 had an SOP imposing a liquidity 
limit, which prohibited its senior managers from unloading stock in any given year 
in excess of 20% of their total equity holdings in the company (including 
outstanding equity awards).179 Compared to recent SOPs, Lehman’s SOP was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. See AK Steel Holding Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 37 (Apr. 12, 2010). 
 178. Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing in September 2008 triggered a widespread 
panic that prompted a global financial crisis. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig, 
Jeffrey McCracken & Jon Hilsenrath, The Two Faces of Lehman’s Fall—Private Talks of 
Raising Capital Belied Firm's Public Optimism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at Al. 
 179. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEA 14A) 23 (Mar. 5, 2008). 
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relatively strict. Nevertheless, the company’s top five executives sold Lehman stock 
worth $1.1 billion between 2000 and 2008.180 This finding suggests that Lehman’s 
SOP did not curtail its executives’ incentives to take excessive risks.181 If a 20% 
annual unloading cap did not curb Lehman’s executives’ incentives to take 
excessive risks, then the significantly weaker unloading limitations in recent SOPs 
should fair much worse.182 
Similarly, because they are ineffectual in preventing managers from unloading 
their incentive compensation, SOPs are not likely to align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders. That managers are able to unload their stock poses the risks 
not only that such stock will be sold and that managers will have less “skin in the 
game” but also that managers will have incentives to act against shareholder 
interests, as they do when they take excessive risks. Thus, ineffective SOPs do not 
discourage such actions and sometimes even encourage them. 
Finally, the ineffectiveness of SOPs precludes these policies from helping to tie 
pay to performance. In the first part of this Article, I explained how SOPs could help 
in this regard by decreasing managers’ ability to (1) avoid suffering personal losses 
resulting from their poor performance, (2) generate personal profits despite their poor 
performance, and (3) earn a salary that is not commensurate with their risk 
management abilities. Because camouflaging the ineffectiveness of such policies 
enables managers to engage with impunity in activities that SOPs were meant to 
prevent, I conclude that SOPs do not live up to the expectations firms have created. 
B. The Camouflage of SOP Ineffectiveness Misleads Investors 
and Inhibits Attempts To Fix These Policies 
While SOP ineffectiveness prevents these policies from attaining their 
intended goals, the camouflaging of such ineffectiveness misleads investors to 
believing that these policies actually achieve their goals. Specifically, when firms 
tout their SOPs as a key element in their mitigation of risk and then camouflage 
the inability of these policies to achieve that goal, they send mixed messages to 
the markets and create confusion. 
If the ineffectiveness of SOPs were transparent, outsiders would know that these 
policies do not live up to the expectations firms have created and do not tie 
managers’ wealth to that of long-term shareholders. Outsiders might mistakenly 
believe that SOPs are effective enough to force managers to hold a significant 
amount of their vested stock for the long term and that their stock holdings would 
encourage them to maximize their firms’ long-term value. 
However, because SOP ineffectiveness is camouflaged, investors tend not to 
realize that these policies do not attain their goals; accordingly, investors are not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 268. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Certainly, Lehman’s aggressive culture contributed to its tendency to take excessive 
risks. However, well-constructed SOPs should be tailored to achieve their goals and to take 
into account the specific firm’s corporate culture, industry, market conditions, managerial 
idiosyncratic situation, and so forth. Lehman’s SOP failed to do so, and its relative strength 
compared with the strength of recent SOPs casts significant doubt on the efficacy of recent 
SOPs to achieve such goals as well. 
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inclined to consider possible responses to remedy this failure. Such responses 
might include three courses of action. First, investors might conclude, after 
weighing the potential costs and benefits of changing their SOPs, that these policies 
should be more effective and therefore might push their firms to make SOPs 
stronger. Second, investors might conclude that SOP ineffectiveness is optimal 
considering the liquidity and diversification costs associated with having effective 
SOPs and, in light of such costs, they might even decide that they prefer not to have 
SOPs. Third, investors might decide that it is more cost-effective to attain SOP 
goals by strengthening other policies. For example, to curb excessive risk taking, 
investors might push for increasing the long-term portions of managerial incentive 
pay or for reducing the convexity of executive pay arrangements by moving from 
stock options to restricted stock pay. 
The camouflage of SOP ineffectiveness and the illusion that these policies 
achieve their goals not only inhibits shareholder action but also makes board action 
unlikely. While the lack of transparency hampers investors’ abilities to make 
accurate assessments of SOPs (and perhaps to pressure boards to change those 
policies), it distracts boards of directors from understanding how these policies 
function (or do not function). Without disclosure of credible and full information 
about the functioning of SOPs, boards are unaware of the need to confer with their 
executives about how SOPs should be designed. Currently, boards are unaware of 
the potential need to improve their SOPs in order to fulfill the important goals they 
are held to attain. 
C. The Camouflage of SOP Ineffectiveness Suggests That Their Weakness 
Is Undesirable 
That the weakness of SOPs is camouflaged indicates that firms think that such 
weakness, if it becomes transparent, will come across as undesirable; otherwise, firms 
would disclose it. A decision to have an ineffective SOP or to avoid adopting an SOP 
altogether is desirable when the personal costs that managers stand to incur if an 
effective policy is adopted outweigh the potential benefits that shareholders stand to 
gain. Because such managerial costs are likely to be rolled over to shareholders183—
for example, in the form of an increase in executive pay—a desirable decision to 
render an SOP ineffective protects shareholders from incurring such costs. 
However, if the weakness of SOPs were a selling point in markets, disclosure of 
their ineffectiveness would be expected to increase stock price and firm value. This 
is consistent with empirical studies that show that corporate governance terms that 
benefit shareholders are associated with higher stock prices.184 Similarly, corporate 
governance terms that do not benefit shareholders are associated with lower stock 
prices.185 Therefore, firms’ choices to camouflage the ineffectiveness of their SOPs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42. 
 184. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning 
and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323 
(2013) (reporting that the disappearance of the correlation between corporate governance 
terms and stock returns in 2000–08 indicates that stock markets started in 2000 to accurately 
price corporate governance terms). 
 185. Id. 
2015] CEO STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES 397 
 
indicate that they think these policies decrease stock value and that their 
transparency would result in a stock price decline. 
D. SOP Ineffectiveness and Camouflage Indicate Managers’ 
Excessive Power vis-à-vis Shareholders 
Adopting ineffective SOPs and camouflaging their ineffectiveness allows 
executives to have the best of both worlds. Namely, it allows them to reap the 
reputational gains associated with having effective SOPs without incurring the 
personal costs associated with stringent SOPs.186 The camouflage of these policies 
allows this to happen because it hides from investors the fact that managers should 
not be rewarded with such reputational gains. Moreover, SOP camouflage makes it 
unlikely that outsiders will exert pressure on firms to make their SOPs more effective, 
which would, of course, force executives to incur the costs they seek to avoid. 
Bebchuk and Fried explain that, for a variety of financial, social, and 
psychological reasons, it is personally difficult for directors in public firms to 
support compensation decisions that are costly for executives.187 This same 
reasoning should explain why it is hard for directors in public firms to support pay 
disclosures that stand to embarrass executives. For example, a director who was put 
on the board by the CEO might feel uncomfortable proposing that the 
ineffectiveness of the SOP, which is supposed to constrain the CEO, be made 
transparent. In this way, executives have considerable power vis-à-vis directors. 
Compared to other corporate policies, SOPs put directors in a greater conflict of 
interest with shareholders. This is because directors are typically subject to SOPs 
similar to the ones that apply to executives. Therefore, the interests of the 
executives with regard to SOPs are aligned with those of their directors, which 
makes the directors’ supervision of the executive team in order to protect 
shareholders significantly harder. The weakness of directorial incentives to use 
SOPs as an effective monitoring tool results in sacrificing shareholder interests for 
the benefit of the executives and the directors themselves. 
Excessive managerial power can also explain why firms tend to disclose their 
SOP provisions selectively and camouflage those that render their policies more 
ineffective. First, the transparency of provisions that render SOPs more ineffective 
is more damaging to executives’ reputation. Second, making limp provisions 
transparent increases the likelihood that outsiders will pressure firms to change 
those provisions and impose direct diversification and liquidity costs on executives. 
Excessive managerial power is also consistent with firms avoiding disclosure of 
sanctions, which leaves significant room for board discretion. Because executives 
possess significant power and influence over directors, it is likely that directors will 
avoid penalizing executives for SOP violations. The phenomenon of allowing 
board discretion in order to save executives from possible punishments is not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. For a discussion of such liquidity and diversification costs, see supra Part I. 
 187. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27 (describing sources of executives’ influence 
over directors in public firms). 
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exclusive to SOPs; it has also been shown that board discretion has been used to 
forego clawbacks of excess pay from executives.188 
VIII. MAKING SOPS TRANSPARENT 
Having shown that the camouflaging of SOP ineffectiveness is fundamentally 
troubling, I now explain why investors are not able to evaluate SOP effectiveness on 
their own. First, as I explained in Part VI, even diligent and dedicated investors are 
commonly unable to evaluate the bottom-line effectiveness of SOPs on their own. 
This happens because firms do not disclose critical terms of their policies and because 
when they do disclose such terms, the functioning of those terms is not apparent. 
Second, even if critical terms are disclosed and their functioning is clear enough, 
investors would have to make multiple calculations and assumptions and would often 
end up with ambiguous estimations. For example, if they wanted information about 
current CEO holdings pursuant to the CEO’s SOP, they would have to extract that 
information from the “Securities Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and 
Management” table in the firm’s proxy statement.189 However, this table is governed 
by Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act and does not follow the SOP 
framework. In particular, it includes stock held in 401(k) plans, in trusts, and by 
family members, but many counting policies fail to address whether such stock 
should be counted. Similarly, in order to calculate the unvested stock that might be 
counted toward satisfying the SOP threshold, they would need to refer to the 
“Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End” table in the firm’s proxy 
statement.190 However, the distinctions that that table makes between various types of 
unvested stock often do not align with the distinctions made by counting policies. 
The inability of investors to analyze SOP disclosures in order to reach 
unequivocal estimates of SOP functioning is similar to their inability to analyze 
executive pay disclosures prior to the 1992 disclosure reform of executive 
compensation. An SEC official describes the pre-1992 camouflage of the amount 
and form of executive pay as follows: 
The information was wholly unintelligible. . . . [T]he typical 
compensation disclosure ran ten to fourteen pages. . . . [Y]ou might get 
reference to a $3,500,081 pay package spelled out rather than in 
numbers. That gives you an idea of the nature of the disclosures: it was 
legalistic, turgid, and opaque; the numbers were buried somewhere in 
the fourteen pages. Someone once gave a series of institutional investor 
analysts a proxy statement and asked them to compute the 
compensation received by the executives covered in the proxy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See Fried & Shilon, supra note 154, at 739 (reporting that boards can exercise 
discretion to avoid clawbacks even if they determine that an executive has committed 
misconduct, and explaining that requiring directors to recoup excess pay, without leaving it 
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statement. No two analysts came up with the same number. The 
numbers varied widely.191 
The 1992 disclosure reform, which required the standardized compensation 
tables that firms must now use, made camouflage more difficult. Such a disclosure 
reform is similarly needed to make SOP camouflage harder. 
Finally, because shareholders know ex ante that even diligent and dedicated 
investors are unable to successfully evaluate SOPs and that such attempts will 
usually produce ambiguous results, they might choose to save the costs associated 
with evaluating SOPs and avoid engaging in this process. Because shareholders are 
typically dispersed and each individual investor will have to incur the full costs of 
evaluating an SOP but will benefit from only a fraction of its potential 
improvement, shareholder efforts to evaluate SOPs suffer from a collective action 
problem.192 Such a problem will discourage shareholders even more from 
attempting to evaluate SOPs. 
It is not only investors who are unable to successfully evaluate SOPs but also 
the influential ISS, whose guidelines are followed by institutional investors and 
firms alike.193 Unfortunately, firms can score high on ISS’s GRId despite their 
grossly ineffective SOPs. According to GRId, when a policy requires a 
six-times-base-salary multiple and a two-year holding period, it gets the highest 
score.194 However, my analysis shows that GRId ignores limp counting policies, 
phase-in periods, and sanctions, as well as hedging activity, and therefore does not 
evaluate the bottom-line effectiveness of SOPs. 
Because SOP camouflage is troubling, because shareholders are unlikely to 
overcome camouflage by evaluating SOP effectiveness on their own, and because 
the ISS does not do a good job at pressing firms to improve their SOPs, there is no 
substitute for a regulatory intervention. Regulatory intervention may take different 
courses. The most aggressive intervention would be implementation of mandatory 
rules for SOP design. This option is not desirable, however, because there is no one 
SOP prescription that fits all firms. The benefits of having SOPs vary greatly 
according to firms’ propensity for risk and the magnitude of internal agency 
problems. Other parameters, such as firm size, industry, and shareholder 
composition and preferences, increase the variance in SOP benefits. The costs 
associated with having SOPs vary significantly as well, depending on such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. Symposium, Executive Compensation Under the New SEC Disclosure 
Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (1995). 
 192. For investors, the term “collective action problem” describes the situation in which 
multiple shareholders would all benefit from taking a certain action (such as exerting 
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accompanying text. 
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idiosyncratic managerial characteristics such as the need for liquidity, voluntary 
stock holdings, risk aversion, and portfolio composition. 
A less intrusive policy suggests default SOP rules. Such rules are designed, on 
the one hand, to allow market forces (to a certain extent) to tailor the desirable 
policy to meet the needs and circumstances of each firm. On the other hand, they 
are also designed to affect the outcome by setting up certain default standards.195 
This course of action might be desirable for certain SOP elements that render these 
policies feckless, such as counting policies or sanctions. However, as a first step, it 
would be preferable to avoid dictating default rules and instead merely mandate 
that SOPs become transparent; this course of action would allow market forces to 
respond freely to such disclosures. 
Making the ineffectiveness of SOPs transparent should allow shareholders, 
boards, and policymakers to engage in a dialogue to improve SOPs according to 
each firm’s individual characteristics and the needs of specific industries.196 
Protecting investors by providing them with critical information about their 
investments is the basic purpose behind securities regulation. Transparency is 
particularly important in the case of SOPs because knowing whether these policies 
accomplish what they were designed to accomplish constitutes critical information 
for investors. Therefore, I turn to discuss a proposal to make SOPs transparent and 
explain why such reform can be expected to start a process that will improve the 
content of these policies. 
A. Proposal To Reform Regulation S-K 
1. Disclosure of SOP Bottom-Line Effectiveness 
I propose to revise Regulation S-K to require disclosure of quantitative indices 
for SOP bottom-line effectiveness. In particular, firms should be required to 
disclose for each of their top five executives (1) the percentage and value of vested 
and nonhedged equity that may be immediately unloaded, (2) the separate values of 
vested and unvested equity held that are recognized by the firm’s SOP counting 
policy, and (3) the percentage and aggregate value of equity sold and accumulated 
during each of the previous three years. Whereas the first indicator highlights the 
extent to which executives may use their freedom to unwind their equity grants, the 
second indicator provides a clear picture of their SOP holdings, and the third 
indicator provides information about the historical changes to their SOP holdings. 
This quantitative information is crucial to enable investors to evaluate the 
bottom-line effectiveness of their firms’ SOPs. 
Once such bottom-line effectiveness indicators are disclosed, reputation 
considerations are expected to push firms to improve their SOPs on their own; 
however, such improvements will not necessarily increase the effectiveness of their 
policies. Some firms might prefer to eliminate their SOPs altogether. This would be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (explaining that default rules can change the outcome 
because equilibrium can be path-dependent). 
 196. For example, bank regulators might be interested in imposing a special SOP regime 
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desirable as well because it would put an end to all the feckless policies that are 
incapable of accomplishing what they were designed to do. 
2. Disclosure of Critical SOP Terms 
In addition to providing indices for SOPs’ bottom-line effectiveness, firms 
should be required to provide qualitative data about the functioning of their SOPs. 
Here I focus on critical terms that have a major impact on SOP effectiveness. In 
particular, the following additional information should be disclosed in firms’ SOP 
narrative sections: 
 
(1) Counting policy and, specifically, the types of stock-based holdings 
that are recognized for satisfying the policy requirements, with a 
special emphasis on unvested stock and hedged stock. When a policy 
allows the counting of unvested or hedged stock, it should specify the 
amount of such stock that it recognizes and the percentage of its target 
threshold that the stock satisfies. 
(2) Applicable phase-in policy, whether its top five executives have 
already phased in, and whether the phase-in policy includes an RHT 
provision. 
(3) Sanctions, if any, that executives face for violating their SOPs. 
(4) Any ongoing stock retention requirements. 
Improved disclosure of SOP bottom-line effectiveness and critical qualitative 
terms will, at a minimum, significantly improve the accuracy of investor 
information and help to ensure that SOPs serve the important goals they were 
designed to attain. Also, this reform will be inexpensive to implement because 
firms generally have access to this information already197 and can undoubtedly 
obtain it at a lower cost than can shareholders or researchers.198 
B. Greater Transparency Should Improve SOPs 
I expect that better transparency will improve the actual content of SOPs 
because investors and boards not only will have a better understanding of what 
these policies do but will also act on this information. Boards are expected to take 
actions to improve SOPs regardless of the pressures they might face from their 
shareholders. Currently, SOP camouflage keeps the problems associated with these 
policies hidden from their directors, who are part-time nonemployees with limited 
time and abundant responsibilities in which to perform their monitoring duties.199 
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Because boards and compensation committees, even if loyal and dedicated, are 
unable to analyze the hidden aspects of all corporate policies, making SOPs 
transparent will provide them with the information they need to evaluate their SOPs 
and will alert them to problems that are currently hidden. 
Better transparency is expected to improve board action even when boards are 
disloyal to investors. When SOPs become transparent, “outrage costs”200 will push 
boards for SOP reform in order to avoid embarrassment and to avoid the social 
costs associated with having SOPs that are incapable of achieving their declared 
goals. Past experience indicates that social costs can significantly affect board 
behavior. For example, boards were more likely to remove the executives 
responsible for stock option backdating when there was greater media attention.201 
In addition, better disclosure will encourage shareholder action because it will 
provide shareholders with the processed information they need to successfully evaluate 
SOPs. Having such information will also alleviate shareholder collective action 
problems because shareholders will no longer need to expend considerable resources in 
order to collect and process such information. And better disclosure will help 
institutional investors identify systemic problems regarding SOPs in their portfolios and 
evaluate proposed SOP reforms. Transparency across the board will make systematic 
analysis available for institutions with a fairly modest investment of resources. 
Finally, the 2006 SEC reform of executive pension disclosure serves as a 
precedent for the kind of reform I propose for SOPs. In 2005, Bebchuk and Jackson 
revealed that executive pension amounts were high and that they were being 
camouflaged.202 Despite the fact that these findings were based on public filings, 
the SEC agreed that a disclosure reform is warranted. Accordingly, in December 
2006 the agency added a new rule, requiring that the value of pensions be made 
transparent, thereby placing executive pension plans on investors' radar screens. 
Following this reform, market prices responded and better reflected the real value 
of executive pensions. In particular, investors expected a more conservative, 
lower-risk operating strategy for CEOs who are entitled to larger executive pension 
amounts. Therefore, bond prices increased, equity prices fell, firm risk decreased, 
and value shifted from equity toward debt holders.203 Similarly, I expect that better 
disclosure of SOPs will improve the informational efficiency of securities markets 
and, hence, firms will be encouraged to improve the actual content of their policies. 
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The current camouflaging of SOP ineffectiveness is even more severe than that 
of executive pensions before its disclosure reform of December 2006. This is 
because, unlike the ability to use certain calculations and assumptions to estimate 
the magnitude of executive pensions before December 2006, one-third of recent 
SOPs cannot be evaluated at all, even if extensive assumptions are made. 
C. Potential Objections to Making SOPs Transparent 
Critics might argue that better disclosure will not be effective to improve the 
content of SOPs because shareholders do not want their firms to adopt effective 
policies. This is because most U.S. shareholders seek short-term gains and therefore 
want managers to have short-term incentives.204 Based on the NYSE index data, the 
mean holding period of U.S. investors in 1940 was around seven years; this stayed 
the same for the next thirty-five years but has since fallen sharply to only around five 
months.205 Moreover, “[s]hort-term trading has become the dominant force in the 
U.S. capital market, accounting for about 78% of total dollar trading volume and 
bringing total share turnover to more than 100% per quarter in recent years.”206 
However, when it comes to corporate governance, institutional investors are more 
relevant than short-term traders. Between 1991 and 2009, as direct individual 
ownership in the United States fell from 60% of the market to 40%, institutional 
investors became the dominant investors, and their prominence is set to continue.207 
Institutional investors, and especially pension funds and life insurers, traditionally have 
investment horizons that are tied to the often long-term nature of their liabilities.208 
Critics might also be concerned that making SOPs transparent would not 
necessarily motivate firms to change the actual content and design of their SOPs. 
Rather, firms might prefer to leave their SOPs intact and explain why they choose 
to adopt ineffective policies, as Viacom has done.209 
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My response to this potential concern is that transparency will encourage checks 
on corporate decisions with regard to SOPs. It might be that some ineffective 
policies should remain weak, and I do not argue that all SOPs should necessarily be 
more stringent. The market checks on these policies will ensure that their design 
and effectiveness are in line with shareholder interests. My argument is consistent 
with the philosophy of U.S. securities law, which requires public companies to 
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. SOPs should 
make no exception to this basic principle. 
Finally, some critics might argue that the enhanced disclosure I propose might 
trigger unintended consequences, such as exerting populist pressure on firms to 
adopt overly restrictive SOPs. As I explained in Part VI, inefficiently stringent 
policies could end up inflating executive compensation and destroying more value 
by making managers too risk averse. Considering the history of congressional 
attempts to reform executive compensation, unintended consequences such as those 
that caused the surge in overall executive compensation as a result of stock options 
and bonuses following the attempt to cap executive salaries in 1993210 should not 
come as a surprise.211 
However, our experience with the market response to the 2006 SEC pensions 
enhanced disclosure reform should alleviate this concern. Disclosure of pension 
payments did not trigger an increase in the amount of pensions. Rather, the 
adjustment of market prices in connection with pension transparency suggests we 
should expect improved efficiency in SOPs when they become transparent. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has investigated SOPs. These policies were universally adopted in 
response to the 2002 corporate scandals and especially to the widespread pressure to 
adopt these policies following the 2008–09 financial crisis. I have shown that firms 
advertise SOPs as a key element in their mitigation of risk and their general alignment 
of managers’ interests with the interests of shareholders. The current U.S. regulatory 
approach to SOPs leaves decisions on the adoption and design of these policies up to 
each firm’s own determination, and disclosure requirements are severely flawed. 
                                                                                                                 
million and $7.9 million as of February 28, 2010), as well as the significant equity holdings 
(with multi-year vesting schedules) of our executive team, the Committee believes senior 
management is appropriately incented to manage the business in line with stockholders’ 
interests and has not established specified executive stock ownership requirements.”). 
 210. In 1993, provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, implemented as 
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, eliminated deductibility for executive 
compensation in excess of $1 million unless it qualified as “performance-based” pay. See 
I.R.C. § 162(m) (1993). While proponents argued that this would constrain compensation 
packages by raising their cost to shareholders, corporate pay decisions have been relatively 
insulated from this policy intervention. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 
Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code To Influence Chief Executive Officer 
Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. S138, S141 (2002). 
 211. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of 
Trying To Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 
1687 (2004) (describing the eventual rise in overall executive compensation following the 
§162(m) attempt to cap executive pay). 
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I contend that SOPs are extremely ineffective in making CEOs retain their firm 
stock and that this ineffectiveness is camouflaged in firms’ public filings. Taken 
together, these two circumstances are troubling. They raise concerns that SOPs are 
unable to fulfill the important objectives they were adopted to attain, that their content 
is undesirable, and that these weaknesses reflect excessive managerial power. I leave 
for future research the empirical investigation of how executive stock hedging 
undermines SOP effectiveness and whether such effect is transparent to investors. 
Such future investigation might indicate that the concerns I highlight in this Article 
are even more severe. 
A regulatory reform that will focus on making SOPs transparent is expected to 
push both boards and shareholders to improve the actual content of SOPs in public 
firms. It would be a cheap and easy way to facilitate an informed assessment of 
SOPs, which would enable constructive discussion on how SOPs should be 
designed. The case for making SOPs transparent is set. 
  

